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Tan, Elizabeth M., M.S., August 1995 Environmental Studies
The Grassroots Struggle for Environmental Justice:
The Need for a New Approach to Public Health in Kern County, California
Committee Chair: Bruce Jennings
Environmental justice activists are fighting to change the fact that poor communities 
and communities of color are disproportionately burdened with environmental hazards 
including toxic waste dumps and incinerators, radio-active waste disposal sites, polluted 
air, contaminated drinking water, and exposure to lead and pesticides.
In the low-income, predominately Latino, farm worker community of Buttonwillow, 
California, Laidlaw Inc. is attempting to expand its toxic waste facility. A community 
group. Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor (Padres), has been organizing to block the proposed 
expansion.
This professional paper examines the role of the local Kern County Public Health 
Department (Department) in the environmental justice movement by addressing the 
following research question: How does the Department’s toxics policy affect Padres' 
struggle for environmental justice?
The Department's toxics policy is based on the philosophy that toxics are not a threat to 
public health unless scientific evidence proves a causal relationship. This policy 
directly undermines Padres' efforts to achieve environmental justice for two primary 
reasons. First, the policy makes the Department less accessible to community groups as 
a potential source of information and support. While the Department claims to practice 
an "expert" scientific approach to public health, the concerns and recommendations of 
"non-expert" community groups are often dismissed as "emotional" and "biased." This 
devaluation of the "non-expert" perspective makes it extremely difficult for groups like 
Padres to participate in the decision-making process and it decreases the potential for 
the development of an effective working relationship with the Department.
The Department also hinders Padres' efforts because its toxics policy conflicts directly 
with the goal of illness prevention. As long as the Department demands scientific proof 
or certainty, people will be harmed before any action is taken. In addition, the 
Department's policy supports the conventional approach to hazardous waste management 
—  pollution control —  which is an "end-of-the-pipe" strategy that focuses on managing 
pollutants after they have been discharged. Pollution control does not prevent pollution 
or illness because it perpetuates the myth that toxics are innocent until proven guilty. 
Toxics Use Reduction, a strategy committed to eliminating or reducing the volume and 
toxicity of the chemicals used in production processes, is presented as the preferred 
alternative because it promotes pollution prevention and illness prevention.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
W e the People of Color, gathered together at this multinational People of 
Color Environmental Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and 
international movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and 
taking of our lands and communities, do hereby re-establish our spiritual 
interdependence to the sacredness of Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate 
each of our cultures, languages and beliefs about the natural world and our 
roles in healing ourselves; to insure environmental justice; to promote 
economic alternatives which would contribute to the developm ent of 
environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political economic and 
cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization 
and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and 
the genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these Principles of 
Environmental Justice..."'
The grassroots environmental justice movement "in all aspects of its operations 
is anti-bourgeois, anti-racist, class conscious, populist, and participatory. It attacks 
environmental problems as being intertwined with other pressing economic, social, and 
political ills."2 Environmental justice activists argue that issues of social justice cannot 
and should not be excluded from traditional mainstream concerns for the environment; 
in addition to being committed to halting the destruction and exploitation of wilderness 
and natural resources, "environmentalists" must also be committed to ending the 
destruction and exploitation of poor communities and communities of color.
The emergence and rapid growth of this grassroots movement has challenged and 
derailed the misconception that the low participation of people of color in the 
mainstream environmental movement reflects their general lack of concern for
 ̂ On October 24, 1991, the First National People of Color Environmental 
Leadership Summit was held in Washington, D.C.. More than 500 grassroots activists 
from the United States, Latin America, Canada and the Pacific voted unanimously to adopt 
17 Priniciples of Environmental Justice.
2 Regina Austin and Michael Schill, "Black, Brown & Poisoned: Minority 
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice," The Kansas Journal of 
Law and Public Policy (Summer 1991): 79.
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environmental issues: "...although many researchers have argued that minorities are too 
busy struggling to meet basic needs to be concerned with environmental issues, 
minorities have redefined environmental issues as survival issues and have been 
organizing around them at an unprecedented rate."3
Environmental justice activists are fighting to change the fact that poor 
communities and communities of color are burdened with the majority of environmental 
hazards including toxic waste dumps and incinerators, radio-active waste disposal sites, 
polluted air, contaminated drinking water, and exposure to lead and pesticides."^ In 
California, for example, all three of the state's Class 1 toxic waste dumps are located in 
the poor, predominately Latino, farm worker communities of Buttonwillow, Kettleman 
City and Westmorland.^
3 Dorceta Taylor, "The Environmental Justice Movement: No shortage of 
Minority Volunteers," EPA Journal 18 (March/April 1992): 24.
 ̂ U.S. General Accounting Office, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their 
Correlation With Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office GAO/RCED -83-168, 1983)[hereinafter GAO, Siting 
of Hazardous Waste Landfills): United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 
Toxic Wastes And Race In The United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio- 
Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 
(1987)[hereinafter UCC, Toxic Wastes and Racel: Jane Kay, "Toxic Racism: Minorities 
Bear the Brunt of Pollution," San Francisco Examiner 7 April 1991; Citizens For A 
Better Environment, Richmond at Risk: Community Development and Toxic Hazards from 
Industrial Polluters (1989); Bradley Angel, "The Toxic Threat to Indian Lands" 
(Greenpeace, June 1991); Jane Kay, "Indian Lands Targeted for Waste Disposal Sites," 
San Francisco Examiner 10 April 1991, A-10; Robert D. Bullard, ed., Dumping in 
Dixie: Race. Class and Environmental Quality (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Robert D. 
Bullard, ed.. Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices From the Grassroots (Boston: 
South End Press, 1993); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Equity: 
Reducing Risks for All Communities. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office 
A 230-R -92-008, June 1992); Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, "Environmental 
Racism: Reviewing the Evidence," in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A 
Time for Discourse, eds. Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai(Boulder: Westview, 1992). For 
an extensive list of additional references, see Luke W. Cole, "Empowerment as the Key to 
Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law," Ecology Law 
Q u a rte r ly  19:619 (1992): 622-627.
5 Buttonwillow is 52% Latino and 11% African-American, Kettleman City is 
95%  Latino and Westmorland is 72% Latino. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Summary Population and Housing 
Characteristics: California. 62, 66, 73.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This siting pattern of toxic dumps in California is not an isolated example. In 
1982 attempts were made to site a toxic polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill in the 
low-income, African-American Warren County, North Carolina; more than 500 people 
were arrested for participating in a civil disobedience campaign against the proposed 
siting.® Although these attempts to block the landfill were unsuccessful, the protest 
received national attention, and as a result, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
launched an investigation to examine the siting of toxic dumps in EPA's region 4 
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and 
Tennessee). The 1983 GAO study revealed that three of the four major toxic dumps in 
that region were located in poor, African-American communities even though African- 
Americans comprised only one-fifth of that region's population.^
The next landmark study on this issue was published in 1987 by the United 
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice. This was the first comprehensive 
national report documenting the connection between race, income and the location of 
toxic waste facilities.® The results from this report were based on two studies initiated 
in 1986; 1) demographic patterns associated with commercial hazardous waste sites; 
and 2) demographic patterns associated with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.® The report 
contained the following conclusions:
• Race was the most significant variable among those tested in determining the location 
of commercial hazardous waste facilities;
® Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, "Environmental Racism: Reviewing the 
Evidence," in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse. 
eds., Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
7 Robert D. Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and 
Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994).
® UCC, Toxic Wastes and Race.
® The report defined a "commercial facility as "any facility (public or private) 
which accepts hazardous wastes from a third party for a fee or other remuneration." The 
term "uncontrolled toxic waste sites" are defined as "closed and abandoned sites on the 
EPA's list of sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the 
environment."
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The proportion of people of color In communities with a toxic waste facility was 
twice as high as the proportion in communities without such a facility. When 
communities had two or more sites, or one of the nation's five largest landfills, the 
proportion of people of color was more than three times as high (38%  vs. 12%);
African American and Latino communities were burdened with three out of the five 
largest commercial hazardous waste landfills. These three landfills represent 40%  
of the total estimated commercial landfill capacity in the United States; and
Three out of five African Americans and Latinos and approximately one half of all 
Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans lived in communities with 
uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
Although the publication of this report helped focus national attention on the 
issue of environmental justice, an updated report, "Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited," 
concluded that conditions have worsened: "...people of color today are even more likely 
than whites to live in communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities than they 
were a decade ago." Some of the major findings from this updated 1994 report revealed 
the following: 1) In 1993, people of color were 47% more likely than whites to live 
near a commercial hazardous waste facility; and 2) Since 1980, there has been no 
improvement —  the percentage of people of color remains three times higher in areas 
containing the highest concentration of commercial hazardous waste facilities."'*^
There are several reasons why companies interested in operating a hazardous 
waste facility may be attracted to poor communities and communities of color: 1) These 
communities often lack the economic resources necessary to utilize traditional legal 
services; 2) These communities often lack the political power necessary to affect the 
decision making process; 3) in poor communities, companies can often win the support
Dr. Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura Fitton, Toxic Wastes And Race Revisited: An 
Update Of The 1987 Report On The Racial And Socioeconomic Characteristics Of 
Communities With Hazardous Waste Sites (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy 
Alternatives, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and United 
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the community by promising jobs and other economic benefitsJ  ̂ In general, these 
communities represent the "path of least resistance."
In addition to the studies investigating the connection between race, socio­
economic status and the siting of hazardous waste facilities, the National Law Journal 
(NLJ) published a special investigation which revealed that there is also a "racial divide 
in the way the U.S.. government cleans up toxic waste sites and punishes polluters."^^ 
Some of the key findings from this report include:
• When hazardous waste laws were violated in communities with the greatest white 
population, the penalties were approximately 500 percent higher than the penalties 
assessed in communities with the greatest population of people of color ($335,566  
vs. $55,318.) Penalties associated with violations of other environmental laws 
including air, water and waste pollution, were 46% higher in white communities.
• Abandoned hazardous waste sites located in communities of color take 20% longer to 
be placed on the national priority action list.
• In more than half of the 10 EPA regions in the country, the clean up of Superfund 
sites begins from 12% to 42% later at sites located in communities of color.
The EPA claims that many factors affect decisions regarding the siting of 
facilities, clean up, and the determination of penalties. Although the economic, legal and 
scientific factors vary in each case, the EPA claims that each situation is handled in the 
same manner regardless of race or socio-economic status. In a 1992 EPA publication, 
the Administrator of the EPA, William Reilly, described the Agency's general position 
regarding the environmental justice debate; "I have a certain idea about environmental 
protection: It is about all of us; it benefits all of us... That's why talk of environmental
11 Robert D. Bullard, "Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities," (A 
paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Race and the Incidence of 
Environmental Hazards, January 25-28, University of Michigan School of Natural 
Resources, 1990).
"'2 Marianne LaVelle and Marcia Coyle, "Unequal Protection; The Racial Divide in 
Environmental Law, A Special Investigation," National Law Journal ( 21 September 
1992): S I .  This was an 8 month study which evaluated census data, the civil court case 
docket of the EPA, and the EPA's own record of performance at 1,177 Superfund toxic 
waste sites.
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racism at EPA and charges that the Agency's efforts pay less regard to the environments
of poor people infuriate me."^^
Professor Robert Bullard, a sociologist at the University of California,
Riverside, disagrees:
The science may be present, but when it comes to implementation and policy, a 
lot of decisions appear to be based on the politics of what's appropriate for that 
community. And low-income and minority communities are not given the same 
priority, nor do they see the same speed at which something is perceived as a 
danger and a threat.""'^
Mr. Reilly argued that, "It is also undeniable that minorities usually benefit 
from - are indeed, sometimes the chief beneficiaries of - more general efforts to protect 
the environment."^5 In the same EPA Journal, others voiced a very different opinion 
when asked: "Have minorities benefited equitably from the gains made by the 
environmental movement?" Excerpts from some of the responses include:
"The answer is clearly no....The social aspects of the environmental movement have, 
almost without exception, systematically excluded people of color. People of color 
are underrepresented at managerial and decision-making levels of both 
governmental and non governmental environmental organizations, including my 
own."*'^ - Michel Gelobter, Assistant Commissioner of Environmental Quality for the 
Department of Environmental Protection of New York City.
"It is an incontestable fact that people of color and the poor of America have borne 
the brunt of suffering from polluting industries and other undesirable development. 
Whether intended or not (and all too often it has been intended), economic growth and 
land use decisions have been based on environmental racism."'’  ̂ - Michael Fischer, 
Executive Director of the Sierra Club.
13 United States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Journal: Environmental 
Protection-Has It Been Fair? (March/April 1992), 18.
Ibid.
15 Ibid., 22.
16 Ibid., 32
17 Ibid., 33. It should be noted that mainstream national environmental 
organizations like the Sierra Club have only recently begun to participate in the 
environmental justice debate. In January of 1990, approximately 150 civil rights 
organizations sent a letter to the national mainstream environmental organizations 
accusing them of environmental racism in their policymaking and hiring practices. 
During that same year, the Southwest Organizing Committee sent another letter focusing
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"No, minorities have not benefited from the environmental movement. Although the 
f^others of East Los Angeles participated in the 20th anniversary of Earth Day, our 
own environmental movement is just beginning. The amount of environmental abuse 
suffered by residents of our barrios is just too g r e a t . "^8 . juana  Beatriz Gutierrez, 
President of the Santa Isabel chapter of the Mothers of East Los Angeles.
Although poor communities and communities of color often lack economic and 
political power, the grassroots environmental justice movement has witnessed an 
increasing number of communities that have stepped off the "path of least resistance" to 
challenge and defeat unwanted projects. An important battle was waged in South Central 
Los Angeles which revealed the underestimated strength of a politically organized and 
empowered community. In 1985, attempts were made to build a solid waste incinerator 
in South Central Los Angeles. The incinerator would have burned 2,000 tons of 
municipal waste per day. The company promised new jobs and other economic benefits to 
this predominately African American and Latino community crippled by a 78%  
unemployment rate and an average income ($8,158) less than half that of the general 
Los Angeles population. While the company was busy selling its project, called 
“LANCER", to the community, concerned citizens began to meet once a week in the local 
library to investigate the potential health effects associated with the project. What they 
found was that if they chose to accept the economic benefits, which turned out to be equal 
to 50 new jobs, they would also be accepting the lung irritations, skin rashes, lesions, 
tumors, and exposure to dioxin that accompany toxic waste i n c i n e r a t o r s .
The group of neighbors who decided to fight the LANCER project formed a 
grassroots community group known as Concerned Citizens of South Central (hereafter, 
"Concerned Citizens"). This group organized protests and rallies during public hearings
on the mainstream environmental organizations' failure to address issues affecting the 
poor and people of color.
I® Ibid.
19 Cynthia Hamilton, "Women Home & Community: The Struggle in an Urban 
Environment," Race Poverty & the Environment ( April 1990): 3; Jesus Sanchez, "The 
Environment: Whose Movement?," California Tomorrow (Fall 1988):11-17.
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and in local parks and churches. When these initial efforts proved to be ineffective, 
Concerned Citizens solicited support from other individuals and groups inside and 
outside of their community including elected representatives, scientists, student 
activists, and predominately white, middle class environmental groups. The resulting 
alliance was rare because it united people of different racial and socioeconomic 
backgrounds.
Although rare, the alliance was effective; in April, 1987, the Los Angeles City 
Council denied the LANCER conditional use permit. Shortly thereafter, another company 
tried to site a toxic incinerator, this time in Vernon, a predominately Latino community 
located just a few miles away. Confronted with this new threat. Concerned Citizens of 
South Central joined forces with another grassroots environmental justice group. 
Mothers of East L. A.. This new alliance. Concerned Citizens and Mothers of East L.A., 
sued the government and won.
One of the defining characteristics of the majority of environmental justice 
struggles is the lack of emphasis and dependence on "experts." Instead, environmental 
justice activists challenge “experts" such as lawyers, scientists and public health 
officials to change the current policies and practices which contribute to social and 
environmental injustice: "The grassroots folk spend a good deal of time battling 
experts.,.in an effort to make questions of risk distribution not simply a matter of 
science and technology, but also a matter of politics and social responsibility."20 
Instead of relying on "experts," the movement often embraces strategies which involve 
direct action such as distributing fliers to educate the community; leading marches, 
demonstrations and protests; and confronting people in power by attending public 
hearings to testify, question, and challenge the decision-makers.
Although the movement's primary strength is found in the angry, determined and 
dedicated voices of grassroots community activists, and although use of "experts" is often
20 Regina Austin and Michael Schill, "Black, Brown & Poisoned," 75.
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de-emphasized, these "experts" —  bureaucrats, lawyers, epidemiologists, engineers —  
still influence the outcome of environmental justice struggles. In many cases, especially 
those involving the siting or expansion of a toxic facility, the role of some "experts" is 
clear; they either advance the goals of the environmental justice movement by providing 
grassroots activists with legal, technical or other support services, or they assist the 
parties interested in siting or expanding the facility. This paper evaluates a group of 
"experts" —  the Kern County Public Health Department (Department) —  within the 
context of an environmental justice struggle currently taking place in Buttonwillow, 
California, where a community group — Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor (Padres) —  is 
fighting to stop the expansion of one of the state's three Class 1 toxic waste dumps 
operated by Laidlaw, Inc..
The Research Question
One of the central objectives of this research paper is to examine the role of 
local public health "experts." As "experts," local health officials practice a scientific 
approach to public health that focuses on gathering and evaluating statistically 
significant numbers and "objective" data. As "experts" they interpret their scientific 
findings to design and implement public health policies.
In addition to being public health "experts," local health officials are also 
responsible for developing and maintaining close ties with the communities in their 
county. This direct link is necessary because local health departments are often the 
primary or only source of health care and information in low-income and rural 
communities. In order to effectively address the communities' health needs and concerns, 
local health departments must be culturally and economically accessible to the public. 
The Kern County Health Department establishes these goals in its mission statement:
"1) maintain culturally appropriate education and public health promotion efforts; 2)
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build and foster strong partnerships for health with local public/ private health and 
social service agencies, community based organizations, consumers, educational 
institutions and other interested community groups; and 3) improve the quality and 
cultural competency of the Department's operations, services and programs.
Although this written mission statement clearly demonstrates the Department's 
commitment to serving the local communities in Kern County, how does this mission 
statement translate into practice within the context of the toxics debate? As "experts," 
how well do they relate to grassroots community groups like Padres who are not 
"experts" in the field of public health? While both the Department and Padres are 
concerned with protecting public health, do they embrace common strategies for 
achieving this goal? Can "experts" and non-"experts" work effectively together?
This paper explores these types of questions by addressing the following 
research question; How does the Department's toxics policy affect Padres struggle for 
environmental justice?
The Department is not formally involved in the permitting process regarding the 
siting or expansion of toxic waste dumps; as a result, it does not officially participate in 
the heated political debates that accompany many environmental conflicts. The 
Department argues that it is obligated to avoid "taking sides" so that it may pursue and 
uncover the "objective" scientific facts in each situation. However, Padres' struggle, 
like most environmental justice battles, is deeply rooted in the group's desire to protect 
the community from health problems that the group believes are linked with toxics. 
Since the stated mission of the Department is to protect public health, one might 
reasonably conclude that these two groups share a common goal. And one might also 
expect that the Department would ally itself with Padres to support the goals of 
environmental justice groups. The Department, however, does not. This indicates
21 Kern County Public Health Department, "Mission Statement." Photocopied,
1 9 9 4 .
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that the Department's actions and policies create additional obstacles that Padres must 
overcome in its struggle for environmental justice.
Although both groups would strongly defend their commitment to protect public 
health, their work is not complimentary because their perspectives towards toxics —  
what they define as the problem and what they define as the solution —  are vastly 
different. While the Department argues that its perspective is "objective" because it is 
based on "scientific" facts, it is this same perspective —  one that is dependent on 
"science" —  that has given Padres and others reason to argue that the Department is not 
fulfilling its responsibilities to protect public health.
The Department searches for "scientific proof" that a health hazard is causing 
illness in a community before it takes any actions to protect the community. At the same 
time, it is extremely difficult to prove that exposure to a specific toxic substance caused 
a particular health problem, especially in the case of chronic illnesses such as cancer or 
birth defects. When epidemiological surveys are conducted in small towns like 
Buttonwillow, statistically valid, conclusive results are rare. Instead, the promise of a 
public health investigation raises the hopes of the community, only to reveal in the end 
that the cause of their problems remains unknown. These types of public health studies 
can hurt a community in its fight for environmental justice because there is no "proof" 
that the toxic dump is causing any health problems; those interested in siting or 
expanding a toxic facility quickly reach the conclusion that these public health studies 
support continued operation of a toxic facility. As a result, the burden of proof is placed 
on the community to demonstrate "scientifically" that the siting or expansion of a toxic 
facility would be hazardous to their health.
The Department's reliance on "scientific" proof to define what qualifies as a 
public health threat represents a significant difference in perspective between the 
Department and Padres. The implications of this difference, in addition to other 
differences uncovered by this research, will be examined in this paper as a tool for
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understanding how the Department has affected Padres' struggle for environmental 
justice.
There were two main reasons I chose to focus on Padres and the Kern County 
Public Health Department. The first has to do with timing: since Padres is still in the 
process of fighting against the proposed expansion of the dump, I was able to take 
advantage of the opportunity to experience a chapter of Padres' struggle as it unfolded. I 
attended meetings where I observed the interactions and listened to the dialogue and 
debate between Padres, the County representatives, and employees of Laidlaw. And most 
importantly, I had the privilege of spending time with the leader of Padres, Rosa 
Solorio-Garcia. During this time, I was also very fortunate to be introduced to Stormy 
Williams, leader of Southern Kern Residents Against Pollution (SKRAP). Her years of 
experience fighting to reduce toxics in her community —  Rosamond, California —  made 
her insights invaluable; she has dealt directly with the Kern County Health Department 
and has witnessed how the Department has handled toxics issues and grassroots groups in 
the past.
I also focused on this particular environmental justice struggle because it is 
taking place in Kern County. Kern County has a history of toxics-related controversies, 
and as a result, the Health Department has had previous experiences with these issues, 
including exposure to grassroots groups fighting to reduce toxics in their communities. 
Before Padres began its fight in Buttonwillow, the Department had already participated 
in two public health investigations in the towns of McFarland and Rosamond. These 
investigations focused national attention on the threat of toxics and the potential link to 
the cancer clusters found in these Kern County communities.
When one reviews these investigations a common pattern appears; a cancer 
cluster was discovered that triggered an investigation; the investigation revealed toxic 
contamination that officials were not previously aware of; public health officials 
attempted to determine whether the contamination caused the cluster but they couldn't
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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find "scientific" proof that a link existed; in the end, the cause was never discovered, 
and the community was left with many questions and no answers. This pattern repeated 
itself in Buttonwillow when a birth defects cluster was discovered in 1991; the 
community feared that the birth defects were linked to the toxic dump but health 
officials were unable to determine what caused the cluster.
This pattern has caused community leaders like Rosa and Stormy to challenge the 
Department's policy and approach to toxics. One of the glaring problems that they see 
reflected in this pattern is the fact that illness prevention through toxics use reduction 
and other pollution prevention measures is not a top priority; instead, a cancer cluster, 
birth defects cluster or other serious illnesses have to be reported before any action is 
taken. Of course, by that time, it is too late. For many concerned members in the affected 
community, the only question that remains is: When and where will the next cancer 
cluster appear?
Methodology
Due to the nature of this project and its focus on a very specific research 
question, the majority of the information was gathered by conducting interviews with 
specific individuals representing key organizations: 1) Rosa Solorio-Garcia, leader of 
Padres; 2) Stormy Williams, leader of SKRAP; 3) Dr. Babatunde Jinadu, Director of 
the Kern County Public Health Department; and 4) Dr. Manzoor Massey, Director of the 
Department's Division of Health Promotion and Public Information.
During the initial interviews with Dr. Massey and Dr. Jinadu, both were asked to 
respond to the following questions: 1) What is the mission of the Kern County Public 
Health Department?; 2) What services does the Department provide to residents of 
Buttonwillow and other Kern County communities?; 3) Do you feel that the Department
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is adequately serving the Buttonwillow community?; and 4) What changes would the 
Department make, if any?
After these general questions were raised, more specific questions followed: 1) Is 
the Department familiar with Buttonwillow's community group. Padres Hacia Una Vida 
Mejor?; 2) What, if any, is the Department’s relationship with Padres?; 3) Would the 
Department be willing to work with Padres?; 4) What is the Department's policy 
regarding toxics?; 5} What was the Department's role in the Buttonwillow birth defect 
cluster investigation?; and 6) What was the Department's role in the investigation of 
Rosamond's cancer cluster?
The interview questions for Padres followed a similar pattern. The first set of 
questions were general: 1) What is the mission of Padres?; 2) Is Padres successfully 
addressing its goals?; 3) What changes or actions would Padres like to implement?; and 
4) W hat are the main barriers faced by Padres? The next set of more specific questions 
included the following: 1) What role does the Department play in Buttonwillow?; 2) 
W hat relationship does Padres have with the Department?; and 3) Can you recommend 
any changes or actions that the Department could implement that would help Padres 
achieve its goals?
The following interview questions for SKRAP focused on the group's fight to 
reduce toxics in its community of Rosamond where the state's highest rate of childhood 
cancer was discovered in 1986: 1) What relationship does SKRAP have with the 
Department?; 2) What role did the Department play in the investigation of the childhood 
cancer cluster?; 3) In your fight to reduce toxics, did SKRAP seek assistance from the 
Department?; 4) Did the Department help or hinder SKRAP's efforts?; 4) Can you 
recommend any changes or actions that the Department could implement that would help 
your group achieve its goals?
After these initial interviews were conducted, I compiled the recommendations 
into one list and sent them to the Department for review. At that time, I explained that
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the recommendations were not based on my personal opinion or assessment of the 
Department; I wanted to make sure he understood that the leaders of two grassroots 
groups from Kern County created this list to reflect their groups’ concerns and 
assessment of the Department. After the Department received the list, I interviewed Dr. 
Jinadu to record the Department's responses to the recommendations.
To establish the context in which the research question will be addressed. 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provide the following background information: chapter 1 introduces 
Padres; chapter 2 surveys the current situation in Buttonwillow; and chapter 3 
describes the mission and policies of the Kern County Public Health Department. This 
chapter will also present a case study of the Rosamond cancer cluster investigation to 
provide insights into the Department's toxics policy.
Chapter 4 evaluates the Department from the perspective of the leaders of two 
grassroots community groups in Kern County, Rosa Soiorio-Garcia of Padres and Stormy 
Williams of SKRAP. This chapter includes specific recommendations made by both 
leaders who were asked to respond to the question: Are there any changes or actions that 
the Department could implement which would help your group in its struggle for 
environmental justice? Chapter 5 documents the Department's responses to these 
recommendations, and finally, chapter 6 discusses the implications of the Department's 
toxics policy. Is the Department's policy consistent with its mission to protect public 
health? Can these local health "experts" work effectively with grassroots groups like 
Padres? The final chapter examines these issues to help answer the central research 
question; How does the Department's toxics policy affect Padres' struggle for 
environmental justice?
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CHAPTER 1
A Closer Look at Grassroots Community Groups: 
Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor
Background
In Buttonwillow, California, a grassroots community group. Padres Hacia Una 
Vida Mejor (Parents for Better Living or Padres), is attempting to stop the proposed 
expansion of a Class 1 toxic waste dump owned by Laidlaw, Inc.'' Padres, was formed in 
1991. Its membership consists of six married couples; all of its members are Latino, 
the men are farmworkers, and all but two of the women are employed full-time. Rosa 
Solorio-Garcia, who was raised in Buttonwillow, is the leader and spokeswoman for 
Padres. She is the mother of three boys, and is an elementary school teacher in the 
nearby town of Shatter. Her husband, Lorenzo Garcia, is also a member of Padres and is 
employed as a farmworker.
Rosa became active in her community when her husband asked if she would 
translate for mono-lingual Spanish-speaking parents at a School Board meeting in 
Buttonwillow. During the meeting, members of the School Board asked her why these 
same parents had never attended meetings in the past. Rosa explained that the parents' 
lack of participation was not due to a lack of interest in their children’s education, but 
instead to the fact that the school never translated any notices or announcements into
1 See, Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Laidlaw: A Corporate Profile 
(1994) [Laidlaw is a 1.9 billion dollar multi-national Canadian corporation based in 
Burlington, Ontario. It is the largest school bus operator, the second largest hazardous 
waste disposal business and the third largest solid waste management business in North 
America. Most of its profits come from its hazardous and sold waste management 
operations - 63.6% of revenue from hazardous/solid waste management compared to 
34.3%  from passenger services. 72% of the revenue is generated in the United States 
while 28%  is from Canada. Laidlaw's operations include 3,000 trucks, 35 landfill sites, 
55 hazardous waste service locations including 2 incinerators, and recycling services 
for 1 million households. Over the past 2 decades Laidlaw has bought out over 250 
companies which were mostly garbage and toxics companies].
1 6
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Spanish. After Rosa described the bilingual programs established at her school in 
Shatter, the School Board agreed to send notices home in Spanish as well as English.
As Rosa was leaving this meeting, three women approached her to discuss another 
meeting regarding the dump. She responded by asking, "What dump?" Although she knew 
there was a dump near Buttonwillow, Rosa had never given it much thought. The 
following week, as Rosa was returning from a school meeting in Shatter, she decided she 
should stop by the Buttonwillow school to see if the Laidlaw meeting was still in session. 
Since it was 10 o'clock in the evening, she was surprised to see the parking lot full of 
cars. When she entered the meeting room she immediately felt out of place; "The whole 
room was filled with white people dressed in suits talking technical. There was only one 
man from Buttonwillow. There were two Mexicans in the back of the room. I decided to 
leave because it was late, I was tired and 1 didn't understand what they were talking 
about."2 As she was leaving, a Latino man stopped her at the back of the room and told 
her that five others had recently left for the same reasons.
Later, the same three women told Rosa that Laidlaw intended to expand the dump. 
They felt that it was important to warn the rest of the community and they turned to her 
for guidance. Rosa felt overwhelmed: "They were all coming to me about this. I'm a 
teacher. I'm not a community activist. I don't know anything about toxic dumps.
The following week, Rosa found herself driving to another Laidlaw meeting in 
Buttonwillow:
All the way home I prayed to God to show me the way because I had no idea. I felt 
all this pressure on me. I was afraid. I thought, I don't know anything about this. 
These people are depending on me to do something and I can't. Where do I go? I 
have no idea who to call. It's not just a matter of interpreting anymore. This is a 
huge company we're dealing with.'^
2 Rosa Solorio-Garcia, interview by author, 10 November 1994.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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When she arrived, the man she recognized from the previous meeting approached and 
introduced himself as Lupe Martinez, field organizer for California Rural Legal 
Assistance. As he began to tell her details about the dump, the proposed expansion, and 
what she could do to challenge the expansion, she decided that others should be listening 
to his advice. She invited him over to her house where they held their first meeting 
about the dump.
Grassroots Organizing
As Mr. Martinez began to work more closely with Padres, he taught the group 
some preliminary tools for organizing a community. One of the first lessons took place 
during the next meeting. The group entered and immediately took seats at the back of the 
room. As Mr. Martinez continued to the front of the room, he turned to motion them 
forward; if they were going to get involved, they should sit in the front of the room to 
make sure everyone knew they were there to participate.
It was through Mr. Martinez that members of Padres learned it was possible to 
contact television stations, radio stations and other media groups. They learned about 
press releases, interviews, and editorials. They made and distributed fliers door to door, 
and organized rallies, community meetings and protests.
When the group first began to work on the issue of the dump. Padres consisted of 
9 women. They conducted outreach throughout the community to educate residents about 
the dump and its related health hazards. Eventually, most of the women left the group 
because their husbands didn't approve; some worried that their wives would get in 
trouble, and others didn't like the fact that it consumed so much of their wives' time. As 
Rosa explains, the Mexican culture doesn't generally support the concept of politically 
active women who have their own voices apart from their husbands; "Mexican women
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are supposed to be inferior to Mexican men, and if you know more than your husband you 
are superior. It’s still there.
As a small grassroots community group, Padres faces many barriers that make 
its work very challenging. Rosa is the only member who is fluent in both English and 
Spanish; a few members have a limited understanding of the English language while two 
members are illiterate.® As a result, the majority of the work that requires writing, 
phone calls, media contact, and interviews, is Rosa’s responsibility. Being a full-time 
school teacher, mother, and wife, she has very little time or energy to organize a 
campaign against a company like Laidlaw with its seemingly endless amount of money, 
time, human resources, and technical expertise.
During a typical day it is nearly impossible for Rosa to work on anything related 
to Padres. She gets a thirty minute lunch break, and since she is not allowed to make 
personal phone calls at work, she must go to a pay phone if she needs to contact somebody 
during work hours. She doesn’t get home until 6 p.m., and then it's dinner, homework, 
showers, and bed for the boys. She feels that her busy schedule has not allowed her to 
reach her potential as an effective grassroots organizer: "I think I could do so many more 
things and I could accomplish long term goals if I only had someone to help me with the 
menial stuff that I don’t have the energy or time to do. I can't think at 11 o’clock.”
Padres also faces financial difficulties since most of its members make minimal 
earnings as farmworkers. When Rosa first became involved, she spent her own money on 
faxes, phone calls, photo-copying, mailing and other group-related expenses. Since 
these expenses were too much for anyone in the group to absorb, Padres began raising 
money by holding annual tamales sales in December which made between 700-800
® Ibid.
® Rosa expressed a desire to bring literacy programs to Buttonwillow, 
recognizing that this would be an important step toward empowering the two women in 
the group and others in the community. However, she explained that she has not been 
able to address the issue of literacy because the struggle with Laidlaw takes up all of the 
group’s time and resources.
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dollars. In addition to the tamales sales, Padres organized community dances where they 
would take advantage of intermissions to educate the audience about the potential 
problems related to the dump. Padres no longer hosts these dances because they were 
expensive and difficult to organize, and many people in the audience didn't appreciate 
paying money to hear about the dump.
Padres has raised approximately 3,500 dollars. The money is used to help its 
members with group-related expenses including phone bills, air conditioning in the 
summer for people who host meetings, and gas money for those who drive to meetings 
held outside of Button willow. The money is also used to help send members to 
conferences on related issues, such as environmental justice. Although Padres raises 
money to cover its own expenses, the money is also available for people in the 
community who have died without the means to pay for their funerals. Padres donates up 
to 400 dollars on these occasions. Padres also donates to people who have experienced 
some unexpected catastrophe such as losing their house in a fire.
Padres' Role in Buttonwillow
Padres also faces the challenge of gaining the support of the Buttonwillow 
community. Rosa hopes that Padres can establish effective working relationships with 
the African-American residents, especially the women, whom she believes are active, 
vocal and strong. The current community organizer from CRLA, Mario Madrid, is trying 
to get African-American churches county wide to join with Padres. Although Padres 
receives support from many Latino residents, there are others who don't agree with 
Padres' goals or the methods used to achieve those goals.
It is not surprising that Buttonwillow residents employed by Laidlaw do not 
support Padres. According to Rosa, one of the most vocal people in Buttonwillow is a 
woman who is married to a Laidlaw employee. She has a business which occasionally
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sends her door to door to sell merchandise. She has been known to use this opportunity to 
discredit Padres, while spreading the word that Laidlaw is a safe company that the 
community would be wise to support.
The town’s Catholic church does not support Padres because it believes the group 
is too radical. The Church maintains that events pertaining to the expansion are beyond 
its control; whatever is meant to be, will be. Many farmers also feel that Padres is too 
radical; they stopped trusting Padres when the group enlisted help from Greenpeace.^
Rosa recalls that Padres had stronger support from the Latino community; 200- 
300 people used to attend the earlier meetings about the dump. Now, Rosa believes that 
many feel discouraged because the process has been going on for so long without 
resulting in any significant change. Rosa, on the other hand, reaches a different 
conclusion: "I see every day that Laidlaw doesn't get the permit as a victory."
Padres' Relationship with Laidlaw
Padres' relationship with Laidlaw is a strained one for obvious reasons. In 
addition to the fact that many in the community would like to shut Laidlaw down, the 
community also resents the fact that money from a special tax on Laidlaw has never 
reached Buttonwillow. During the last six years, Laidlaw has paid more than 5 million 
dollars in a special tax for the impacted community. Although Buttonwillow is the closest 
community to the dump and although Buttonwillow bears 93%  of Laidlaw's toxic traffic, 
all of the money has been spent in other areas of Kern County. According to Supervisor 
Ken Peterson, the money “is used everywhere and nowhere specifically... It definitely
 ̂ A notable exception is Dennis Palla, a farmer who used to live in Buttonwillow, 
and one of the first people to fight Laidlaw back in 1985. Palla became involved when he 
learned that the state planned to bring Superfund waste from Southern California to the 
Buttonwillow dump. He sued the state and was successful.
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does not come back to Buttonwillow, and it seems all the other supervisors would rather 
keep it that way."®
According to Larry Moxley, vice president of governmental affairs for Laidlaw, 
"The entire express intent was that money be used for the impacted community and to 
date that money has not been used for that purpose. If it had been, or even a portion of it 
had been, we probably would have much improved relations with the community of 
Buttonwillow." This is not necessarily true, at least not according to Gloria Ramos- 
Byrd, president of the Buttonwillow Chamber of Commerce: "Regardless of the money 
Laidlaw gives to the community, that wouldn't change our minds that we didn't want this 
facility when it came here ten years ago and we still don't." Regina Houchin, the town's 
school board chairwoman, also believes that the community would be opposed to the 
expansion, regardless of the amount of money Laidlaw contributed to the community: 
"There's no price tag on your health and safety.”®
Although Buttonwillow has not received any of the special tax money, Rosa and 
others argue that Laidlaw has still tried to buy off their community by donating 
regularly to the school, supporting senior citizen events and helping to fund the school's 
new computer room. Laidlaw also bought the community a batting cage, something the 
community has wanted for a long time. Across the batting cage there is a sign reading 
"Laidlaw." According to Rosa, one can literally see Laidlaw's influence all over the 
community.
Laidlaw's influence was definitely apparent during last year's Cinco De Mayo 
celebration. Laidlaw donated money to the celebration by buying the tickets that are sold 
to determine who will be crowned Queen. Each Cinco De Mayo ticket read, "Sponsored by
® Tom Maurer, "Kern gobbles Tax Meant for Small town," The Bakersfield 
Californian 11 July 1994, 1. Instead of being spent directly in Buttonwillow, the tax 
money has gone into Kern County’s general fund which pays for services like fire 
protection, law enforcement, courts, parks and libraries.
® Ibid., 2.
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Laidlaw." When Rosa found out, she went to the school to express her anger that the 
school was using its students to promote Laidlaw. Rosa received an apology with an 
explanation that the School Board was unaware that Laidlaw was going to involve itself in 
that manner. Rosa received many calls from people in the community who didn't 
understand why the company they were fighting was sponsoring their celebration.
On the day of the celebration, many people did not attend because of Laidlaw's 
interference. The superintendent blamed Rosa and falsely accused her of organizing a 
boycott of the celebration. As a result, the superintendent revoked Padres' privilege of 
using the school free of charge to hold its community meetings; now, if the group wants 
to use the building, it has to go through the official routes. This means that Padres has to 
reserve the room a month in advance and pay 50 dollars an hour. Since Padres can't 
afford this fee every time the group needs to hold a meeting, gatherings are held in 
people's homes and backyards.
When Rosa was asked to describe Padres' relationship with Laidlaw, she 
explained that she used to be the type of person who Inherently trusted people: "I always 
thought that the government was there to protect you. I thought the EPA was there to 
protect the public's health...I grew up being taught not to question." Her perspective 
changed dramatically after she attended a Highlander training seminar^^ that taught her 
to question her world, and Laidlaw: "Highlander took the blinders off and taught me that 
you need to look out for your own community...! used to always see the best in people.
Now you have to distrust everyone until they prove otherwise. That's hard to do."
Now, as a teacher, she tries to share some of her insights with her students: "I 
teach kids that they're supposed to respect adults but it's good to question. And if you 
don't like something, do something about it."
“*0 Highlander Research & Education Center is located in New Market, Tennessee. 
It provides training for social activists from labor, civil rights, social and economic 
justice and environmental groups.
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Summary
Padres' fight to stop the expansion of Laidlaw's toxic waste dump is a good 
example of the grassroots environmental justice struggles that are taking place around 
the nation. Like Padres, members of these community groups are not formally trained 
activists or community organizers; environmental justice battles are most often fought 
by concerned parents and residents of the impacted community who have organized 
around the shared goal of protecting their children and their community from health 
hazards associated with toxic substances and other environmental hazards. Like Padres, 
most community groups are existing on extremely limited resources, while they face 
opponents like Laidlaw who are economically and politically more powerful.
To provide a better understanding of the challenges that face grassroots 
community groups in the environmental justice movement, the following chapter takes a 
closer look at the events and issues surrounding Padres' struggle to stop the expansion of 
Laidlaw's toxic waste dump.
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Chapter 2
Buttonwillow, California; Profile of a Community at Risk
Communities disproportionately burdened with our nation's environmental 
problems share a common profile; the vast majority are low-income and communities of 
color. The town of Buttonwillow, host to one of California's three Class 1 toxic waste 
dumps, fits this profile; the 1990 Census reveals that people of color represent slightly 
more than sixty-one percent of the population (Latinos-slightly more than fifty 
percent; African-Americans-eleven percent) and thirty percent of the households are 
below poverty level. ̂
When Laidlaw first proposed the expansion of its Lokern facility in October of 
1991, Padres organized hundreds of Buttonwillow residents who attended public 
hearings, rallies and protests to express their disapproval of the project. When the 
permitting process was initiated, the Kern County Board of Supervisors appointed a 
Local Assessment Committee (LAC)^ to review the project and negotiate with Laidlaw to 
determine the conditions under which the proposed expansion would be "acceptable" to 
the community.^ In June, 1992, after the LAC had met six times, the Board of
 ̂ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1990 Census Of Population: 
General Population Characteristics- California (Section I of 1111. (July 1992), 42. 
(hereafter "1990 Census"). It should be noted that the percentage of people of color in 
Buttonwillow is most likely greater because of the significant undercounting of people of 
color in the 1990 census. See Citv of New York v. United States Department of 
Com m erce. 34 F .3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994). The 1990 census undercounted Hispanics by 
5.2%. M l at 1121-1122. Historically, census figures have undercounted ethnic and 
racial minority groups. at 1117.
2 When a potential operator, such as Laidlaw, files a "Notice of Intent", the 
county Board of Supervisors is required by state law to appoint a LAC to "Represent 
generally, in meeting with the project proponent, the interests of the residents of the 
city or county and the interests of adjacent communities." See  Health and Safety Code 
§ 2 5 1 9 9 . 7 ( ( d ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ) .
2 The LAC process has been defined as a "classic catch-22" by Padres' attorney, 
Luke Cole. In a Title VI complaint written on behalf of Padres (discussed in more detail 
later), Mr. Cole explains, "if the community takes part in the LAC process, it is seen as 
signing off on the dump proposal; if it boycotts the LAC process, the dump could be
2 5
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Supervisor's representative, Planning Director Ted James, postponed the process 
because the project lacked a Final Environmental Impact Report (EIR).'^ The Final EIR 
was completed in approximately two years, and the LAC met again on September, 27, 
1 9 9 4 .
When the LAC meetings resumed, so did the debate over the Spanish-speaking 
residents' request for the translation of public notices, public hearings, and documents 
relating to the expansion of the dump. The issue of translation was raised during the 
first hearings in 1991 when Spanish-speaking residents expressed interest in 
participating in the permitting process. Since the beginning of Padres' fight to stop the 
expansion. Padres has argued that Spanish-speaking residents are being excluded from 
the permitting process because they can not speak or understand English.
The translation issue peaked when the publication of the Final EIR appeared. At 
that time, the LAC had one newly appointed member, a Latino resident from 
Buttonwillow, Mr. Eduardo Montoya. Due to his limited understanding of English, 
especially the technical language used in the EIR, the LAC, after significant deliberation 
and debate, voted to request that the County translate, or allow the LAC to hire someone 
to translate, the EIR into Spanish. When the request reached the Board, its members 
voted unanimously against translation.
established with no mitigating conditions." See Before The United States Environmental 
Protection Agency And The United States Department of Housing And Urban Development, 
Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor, El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, and Concerned 
Citizens of Westmorland, Complainants, v. Laidlaw, Inc., Chemical Waste Management, 
Inc., California Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Substances 
Control, State Office of Permit Assistance, Kern County, Kings County, Imperial County, 
San Joaquin Air Pollution Control District, Imperial County Air Pollution Control 
District, Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board, Colorado River Basin 
Regional Water Quality Control Boards, Respondents. Complaint Under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 40 C.F.R. Part 7 And 24 C.F.R. Part 1, at 
9. [hereinafter Title VI Complaint].
 ̂ Under the California Environmental Quality Act, the County is required to 
prepare an EIR if the project might significantly affect the environment. This document 
is crucial to the permitting process because it contains the Draft Environmental Impact 
Report, public comments, comments from the state and local agencies and the County's 
responses to the comments.
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Because the Board acted directly against the wishes of the LAC and the Spanish­
speaking residents of Buttonwillow, the issue of translation remains a central point of 
conflict. While the LAC contends that they need more time to review the Final EIR, the 
Board argues that the LAC wasted time on the translation issue and subsequently failed to 
properly carry out its duty to negotiate "acceptable" conditions with Laidlaw and the 
com m unity.5
Padres and others claim that the County's refusal to translate vital information 
relating to the project has illegally kept them from fully participating in the permitting 
process. When the County failed to respond to over 200 letters written by Latino 
residents in response to the project's Draft EIR ®, Padres accused the County of 
environmental racism;
W e ’ve been asking for two years for them to translate this information into 
Spanish since 65% of Buttonwillow residents speak Spanish....They've always 
refused to do that, but now they won't even respond to our comments. They are 
excluding a lot of people from the process because they speak Spanish. That's 
simple discrimination.^
Although the issue of translation initiated a heated debate between the County, the 
LAC, Padres and others involved in the permitting process, this was by no means the
5 In this case the LAC process is under heavy scrutiny by both the County and 
Padres. While the County argues that the LAC has unsatisfactorily conducted its job, 
Padres' attorney, Luke Cole, argues that the LAC has not been given adequate time to 
carry out its statutorily-mandated duties: "Local Assessment Committees empanelled in 
other jurisdictions have taken between 18 months and four years to complete the 
negotiations with facility proponents. The LAC in this case was given from September 27 
to December 12-about 10 weeks. This is a ridiculous schedule, and indicates to 
impartial observers that the Board has no interest in what the LAC comes up with." See 
Luke W. Cole & Anne Katten, Testimony on the Proposed Expansion of Laidlaw's Lokern 
Facility (California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Center on Race, Poverty and the 
Environment, December 12 1994), 5 [hereinafter Cole & Katten, Testim ony].
G 276 letters were written by Buttonwillow residents which is the greatest 
number of letters ever received in Kern County regarding an Environmental Impact 
Report. Although 217 out of the 276 letters were written in Spanish, the County did not 
respond to these letters. Padres' attorney, Luke Cole, is using this lack of response as 
one reason to challenge the Final EIR.
 ̂ Tom Maurer, "County Won't Exchange Words," Bakersfield Californian. 3 June 
1994,  A1-A2.
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only concern raised by the community. Over 200 letters documented the residents' fear 
that exposure to the dump may cause serious health problems including: birth defects, 
miscarriages, sterility, cancer, respiratory illnesses, headaches, and nausea. The issue 
of health problems peaked during a period of eight months from 1992-1993, when two 
babies were born in Buttonwillow with neural tube defects. Members of the community 
feared that the defects were related to the dump. A representative from California Rural 
Legal Assistance reported the community's concern to the California Birth Defects 
Monitoring Program to initiate an investigation of the cluster.® Although the study did 
not find a direct link between the dump and the birth defects, birth defects remain an 
important health issue of concern to many residents of Buttonwillow.
The community is also concerned that an expansion would increase the potential 
for air and water contamination, on-site accidents, chemical spills, and traffic 
accidents involving Laidlaw's trucks. This toxic traffic is especially dangerous because 
the truck route passes directly by the town's elementary school.^
The fact that Laidlaw has a nationwide performance record of violations and 
accidents makes Buttonwillow residents even more concerned about the potential dangers 
associated with living near a toxic dump. Padres and its attorney have argued throughout 
the permitting process that Laidlaw is a "convicted environmental criminal with a 
horrendous and worsening record of compliance nationwide";^® for example:
® California Birth Defects Monitoring Program, Neural Tube Defects in Kern 
Countv: Buttonwillow Area Cluster Investigation. (November 1993). This report 
explains that neural tube defects "result when the neural tube (precursor of the spinal 
cord/brain) fails to close, a process normally completed 1 month after conception.
Spina bifida and anacephaly are the two most common forms" (p.1).
® Truck traffic and the current route through town is a central issue addressed in 
the Final EIR. One of the mitigation factors is that the trucks will be re-routed to a 
different road that does not pass by the elementary school. Padres and others are 
concerned that this new route will be impossible to enforce. There is additional concern 
that if the dump is allowed to expand, traffic and air pollution will increase in a town 
which already suffers from below-acceptable air quality.
1® Cole & Katten, Testimonv. 2.
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Laidlaw's 1992 Form 10-K , filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
reveals that Laidlaw is a potentially responsible party in 14 Superfund s ites / ^
In 1987, Laidlaw was fined $350,000 at its Lokern facility in Buttonwillow for 14 
violations, penalties of nuisance odors, non-compliance with all permit conditions, 
and failure to conduct weekly inspections. On January 30, 1989, a spill of more 
than half a million gallons of "non-hazardous liquids" occurred due to human error 
and an inferior weld.'' ^
At its Cleveland, Ohio GSX Chemical Services Facility, Laidlaw's toxic incinerator 
was shut down by the Ohio Attorney General's office and Ohio EPA after repeated 
accidents, violations and fines. In a 1989 report, Ohio EPA Director Richard Shank 
enumerated Laidlaw's problems: "Cyanide wastes in unmarked barrels, incompatible 
wastes stored near each other, operating records were missing or had been taken 
home by employees, 34,000 pounds of wastes received without any records. " He 
concluded, "[Laidlaw's operation] is horrendous and shoddy...I never would have 
dreamed that (Laidlaw) would get themselves into this kind of trouble...this is not 
some corner drug store, this is a hazardous waste facility"^^
In 1991, Laidlaw was cited in Westmorland, California for a fire at the dump caused 
by mixing incompatible wastes.
In September, 1993, Laidlaw was fined $1,825,000, for violations at its facility 
in Pinewood, South Carolina, the largest environmental fine in the history of that 
State.
In 1994, Laidlaw was fined $1,055,144.20 by the State of Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality for the following violations at its Crowley dump -  three 
fires, operating parts of the facility without permits, and illegally disposing of 
hazardous waste in non-hazardous landfills."'®
Laidlaw's compliance record remains an issue of dispute between Padres and the 
County. In the written testimony submitted by Padres' attorney it was argued that one of
Ibid., 27
12 For more information of Laidlaw's violations at its Lokern Facility, see State 
of California Department of Health Services, Toxic Substances Control Program, 
Inspection Report: Laidlaw Environmental Services (Lokern Facilitv) (April 1991) .
13 Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Laidlaw: A Corporate Profile 
(1994), 7-8 [hereinafter CCHW , La id law ].
14 State of California Department of Health Services, Toxic Substances Control 
Program, In the Matter of Laidlaw Environmental Services (Imperial Valiev). Inc.. 
Corrective Action Order and Complaint for Penalty (May 24, 1991).
1® Cole & Katten, Testimony. 27-28; CCHW, Laidlaw.
1® State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, In the Matter of
Laidlaw Environmental Services in Crowlev Louisiana. Penaltv Notice (January 26,
1 9 9 4 ) .
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the largest flaws In the Final EIR was its failure to consider Laidlaw's national and 
international performance record. The EIR's Response to Comments claims that the 
Board should only be concerned with Laidlaw's performance at its Lokern facility.
In addition to the County's failure to consider Laidlaw's compliance record, 
Padres' attorney has enumerated many other reasons why the Final EIR is inadequate and 
should be rewr i t t en . Al t hough Padres and others feel that there has been an inadequate 
review of the proposed expansion, and although the LAC argued that it needed more time 
to complete its review of the EIR and negotiate with Laidlaw, the Board observed its 
original deadline and voted in favor of the project on December 12, 1994."'®
Although Laidlaw has received initial approval from the Board, Padres continues 
to fight against the expansion. On December 9, 1994 , Padres, along with two other 
grassroots community groups from California, filed an environmental justice challenge 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD)."'® The administrative complaint, drafted by California Rural Legal 
Assistance's Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment and the University of California 
at Berkeley's Environmental Law Community Clinic, alleges violations of Title VI, in
17 Cole & Katten, Testim onv. 8-30.
1® In addition to the County's approval, Laidlaw must receive permits from the 
State Department of Toxic Substances and Control(DTSC), the Central Valley Regional 
W ater Quality Control Board and the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control 
D is tric t.
1® Civil Rights complaints are a new strategy in the environmental field; the 
first Title VI case was filed last year. It has been used primarily by community groups 
in the south. This is the first such complaint to be filed west of Texas. These complaints 
are being filed during a time when the Clinton Administration has officially shown 
support for the environmental justice movement. In February, 1994 President Clinton 
signed an Executive Order on environmental justice- (Executive Order 12898 of Feb 
11, 1994: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations 
and Low-1 ncome Populations § 2-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7630-31 (Feb 16, 1994).
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the siting, permitting, expansion and operation of California's three Class 1 toxic waste
dumps.20
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, programs or activities which 
receive federal financial assistance can not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin. The respondents named in this complaint —  California Department of 
Toxic Substances Control, Kern County, Kings County, Imperial County, Laidlaw, Inc., 
Chemical Waste Management, two water boards and two air pollution control districts —  
all receive federal financial assistance from either the EPA or HUD and can therefore be 
named in a Title VI complaint.
To win under Title VI one does not have to prove intent, but only show 
discriminatory impact. The complainants conclude that:
...systematic, ongoing discriminatory impact is evident in three ways: 1) Latino 
communities have 100% of the existing toxic dumps [in California], and will 
live with the dangers and health consequences of the dumps every day; 2) When 
Laidlaw and Chem Waste want to increase California's toxic dump capacity, they 
look to the existing Latino communities already burdened by dumps, and propose 
expansions or new facilities there. For example, in the past five years, Chem  
Waste has sought to build a toxic waste incinerator at its facility and Laidlaw has 
sought to expand the capacity of both the Buttonwillow and Westmorland dumps; 
and 3) None of the local, regional, or state regulatory agencies take any steps to 
require--or even encourage-attem pts to handle problems of toxic waste 
disposal without increasing the burdens on Latino communities. As a result, 
Latino communities are a permanent target area for toxic waste dumps.21
To stop what Padres and others feel to be an obvious pattern of discrimination in 
the permitting, siting, and operation of toxic facilities in California, the complainants
20 See Before The United States Environmental Protection Agency And The United 
States Department Of Housing And Urban Development, Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor, El 
Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, and Concerned Citizens of Westmorland, 
Complainants, v. Laidlaw, Inc., Chemical Waste Management, Inc., California 
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Substances Control, State Office 
of Permit Assistance, Kern County, Kings County, Imperial County, San Joaquin Air 
Pollution Control District, Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, Central 
Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board, Colorado River Basin Regional Water 
Quality Control Boards, Respondents. COMPLAINT UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200D 40 C.F.R. PART 7 AND 24 C.F.R. PART 1.
21 Ibid., 51.
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conclude that "EPA and HUD should require the respondents to impose an immediate 
moratorium on the siting and expansion of any toxic waste facilities in communities of 
color in California, as a condition of continuing to receive federal financial
assistance."22
Summary
Padres is confronted with many significant obstacles; in addition to the fact that 
its opponent is economically and politically more powerful, Padres also faces a system 
that does not allow Spanish-speaking people the opportunity to fully participate in the 
permitting process. The controversy surrounding the LAC and the translation issue is a 
clear example of the different power struggles involved in the toxics debate; although the 
LAC is supposed to represent the interest of the community, it has no true power. After 
months of deliberation about the community's request for translation, the LAC voted in 
favor of fulfilling that need. Nevertheless, in one meeting the County Board of 
Supervisors voted unanimously to deny the request.
While Padres faces obvious opponents, including representatives of Laidlaw and 
the County, there are other players that affect Padres' struggle for environmental 
justice. The next chapter introduces the Kern County Health Department in an attempt to 
understand its role in Padres' struggle. Although the Department is not directly involved 
in the permitting process regarding the siting or expansion of toxic waste dumps, it still 
affects Padres because, like most environmental justice battles, Padres' struggle is 
deeply rooted in its desire to protect the community from toxics-related health 
problems.
Since the stated mission of the Department is to protect public health, one might 
conclude that these two groups share a common goal. One might also reason that the
22 Ibid., 5. [For a more complete list of recommendations see pp. 51-54].
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Department's policies and actions would support the goals of Padres and the 
environmental justice movement. However, interviews conducted with the Director of 
the Department, Dr. Jinadu, reveal that the Department has not allied itself with groups 
like Padres; instead, the Department's toxics policy, whether intended or not, creates 
additional obstacles that Padres must overcome in its fight for environmental justice. 
The work of the Department has not supported Padres because the groups' perspectives 
towards toxics —  what they define as the problem and what they define as the solution —  
are vastly different. The following chapter takes a closer look at the Department's policy 
and perspective on toxics.
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CHAPTER 3
The Kern County Public Health Department
This chapter describes the fundamental character and perspective of the Kern 
County Public Health Department (Department) by providing an overview of the 
Department's "Mission Statement" and its "Directory of Services." Next, the chapter 
presents an interview with the Department's Director, Dr. Jinadu, to establish the 
Department’s perspective on toxics; although the Department's literature does not 
specifically address the issue of toxics, the interview reveals that the Department has a 
toxics policy that Dr. Jinadu believes is consistent with its overall mission to protect 
public health.^ Finally, the chapter concludes with a case study of the investigation of 
Rosamond’s cancer cluster to demonstrate the complexity of the toxics debate.
Mission Statement
The Department's "Mission Statement" establishes the following goals;
• reduce the occurrence of preventable disease, disabilities, premature deaths and 
promote wellness;
• assess needs and close the gaps in health services and enhance access to care among 
diverse population groups;
• provide leadership in setting community public heath standards in reforming health 
care into a coordinated, accountable, and affordable system which emphasizes access 
to appropriate preventative measures and quality services;
• maintain culturally appropriate education and public health promotion efforts;
iThe  information for this chapter was gathered from three sources;
1) Department's literature: Mission Statement and Directory of Services: 2) Dr. 
Manzoor Massey, Director of the Kern County Public Health Department Division of 
Health Promotion and Public Information, personal interview by author, 17 November 
1994; and 3) Dr. Babatunde Jinadu, Director of the Kern County Public Health 
Department, phone interview by author, 17 February 1995.
3 4
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build and foster strong partnerships for health with local public/ private health and 
social service agencies, community based organizations, consumers, educational 
institutions and other interested community groups; and
improve the quality and cultural competency of the Department's operations, 
services and programs.
working together as a team and making shared decisions (sic).
Directory of Services
The Department's "Directory of Services" emphasizes a commitment to making 
quality health care accessible to everyone: "Kern County Department of Public Health is 
dedicated to serving the public. Multi-lingual, culturally sensitive staff provide you 
with a wide range of services...We are here to serve you."̂  The following services are 
listed in this directory. Additional information about some of the services is included to 
gain a better understanding of the scope of the Department's activities.
- Media Relations and Information - HIV/AIDS Programs
- Health Statistics/Birth and Death Certificates - Public Health Laboratory
- Preventative Health Care for the Aging (PHCA) - Animal Control Services
California Children's Services (CCS)- CCS is a statewide program that 
provides financial assistance to low-income eligible families with children who have 
certain physical handicaps or severe illnesses.
Child Health & D isability Prevention (CHOP) and Treatm ent Program.
The CHDP Program provides early health care to low-income eligible children 
including a physical exam, hearing and vision screening, blood testing, WIC referral 
and immunization. The goal of this program is to prevent the development of more 
serious health problems later in life.
Maternal Child and Adolescent Health (MCAH)- There are several services 
which concentrate on providing health care to women and children: 1)The Perinatal 
Outreach Program (POP)conducts door to door outreach to locate women in need of 
prenatal care. The program is intended to provide support services for a woman 
throughout her pregnancy until the infant's second birthday: 2) The Comprehensive 
Perinatal Services Program works with Medical providers to improve the delivery 
of comprehensive perinatal services to medical eligible pregnant women; 3) Black
2 Kern County Public Health Department, "Directory of Services."
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Infant Perinatal Improvement Program focuses on serving preconceptual, pregnant 
and post-partum African-American women in high risk areas in an attempt to 
reduce infant mortality and improve birth outcomes; and 4)The Fetal/Infant 
Mortality Review Project studies the health problems associated with fetal and 
infant death to learn how to improve outcomes.
• Public Health Nursing Services - Multi-lingual/m ulti-cultural staff work in 
the clinics and also make home visits. Some of the services include: 1) Education 
about the dangers associated with substance abuse during pregnancy; 2) Conducting 
follow-up home visits for babies with special health problems such as congenital 
defects, low birth weight, failure to thrive, or drug exposure; 4) Education about 
how to prevent and control communicable diseases such as AIDS, TB, Giardia, 
Salmonella and Hepatitis; and 5) Clinical services such as pregnancy testing, family 
planning and immunizations for children and seniors.
• C om m unity  Health  Prom otion /E ducation /R esources - "Ones present 
lifestyle is the best indicator of one's future health condition. Multi-lingual and 
multi-culturally trained staff work with schools, churches, community based 
agencies, clubs, sports organizations, and persons with special needs. They provide 
the public with information, education and training to promote healthy lifestyles and 
how to prevent disease." The following services are offered:
- Smoking prevention and cessation information
- Self-Help Quit Smoking Kits
- Assistance with developing smoke-free polices for businesses and communities
- Child health and disability prevention education
- Health promotion programs for seniors
- Consultation on health fair planning
- AIDS and other sexually transmitted disease prevention education
- Perinatal education program consultation
- Presentation on general public health- most subject areas included
- Information/education materials on most health topics
- Information to students on health issues
- Consultation on clinic patient education
Role of the Department in Buttonv^illow
In Buttonwillow, a nonprofit organization, National Health Services, Inc. (NHS), 
operates a health clinic which provides the following services:
- primary preventive medical services - comprehensive prenatal care
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- preventive and restorative dental care - nutritional assessment and
counseling
- health education counseling - psycho-social assessment and
counseling
- periodic screening of adults and children - management of chronic medical
problems
- pharmacy and drug reaction services - laboratory and x-ray services
- outreach and transportation - family planning program
- individual managed care program - on call 24 hour services.
- comprehensive pediatric, adolescent, adult
and geriatric care programs
As a general rule, if there is a primary care provider such as NHS already 
established in a community, the Department will not duplicate services. If a community 
does not have a primary care provider, the Department will try to find one for that 
community; only as a last resort does the Department want to take on the responsibility 
of providing primary care. According to the Director of the Department, Dr. Jinadu, this 
is not the Department's role; instead, the "core functions of a public health department 
are assessment, policy development and assurance.''^
In communities like Buttonwillow, where the Department is not the primary 
care provider, the Department's role is one of surveillance and investigation of reported 
diseases or "unusual" incidents. Under the state's Health & Safety Code, certain 
communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, must be 
reported to the Health Department. In addition to reportable diseases, health care 
providers as well as individuals in the community are expected to inform the 
Department about any "unusual " occurrences. It is then the Department's responsibility 
to investigate.
3 Dr. Jinadu, Director of the Kern County Public Health Department, phone 
interview by author, 17 February 1995.
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Currently neither NHS nor the Department has conducted a needs assessment to 
determine the specific health problems and concerns of the Buttonwillow community.
The Department does not normally conduct needs assessments or maintain specific files 
on individual communities the size of Buttonwillow. In Dr. Jinadu's opinion "the needs of 
Buttonwillow are probably no more than the needs of other small towns." Dr. Jinadu also 
explained that the Department would not spend resources to conduct a needs assessment 
only on the town of Buttonwillow; instead, it would group Buttonwillow with other small 
towns until the study group reached approximately 50,000 residents.
The Department does keep certain health statistics on its computer system such 
as birth and death statistics and immunization records. The Department can gain access 
to this information by entering a zip code for a specific area. For example, the 
Department could enter Button willow's zipcode and find out how many children under the 
age of two have been immunized. The immunization rate could then be compared to the 
rate in other communities in the County or the state.
When asked if he feels the Department is adequately serving the needs of the 
Buttonwillow community. Dr. Jinadu replied in the affirmative and when asked if he 
would make any changes, he explained; "No. There is nothing that has come to our 
attention to make that necessary."^
Relationship with Padres
The Department does not have a relationship with Padres; neither the Director of 
the Department, Dr. Jinadu, nor the Director of the Division of Health Promotion and 
Public Information, Dr. Massey, were familiar with this community group.
4 Ibid.
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Toxics Policy
To gain an understanding about the Department's toxics policy, segments of a 
phone interview with Dr. Jinadu will be presented. Although Dr. Jinadu speaks with 
confidence on this subject, the Department's actions and decisions have been criticized 
by others involved in the toxics debate [an evaluation of the Department from the 
perspective of two grassroots environmental justice leaders appears in the following 
chapter]. The interview questions are in bold and Dr. Jinadu's responses are direct 
quotes transcribed from a recorded phone interview.^
Does the Departm ent have a toxics policy?
Yes. This department is here to protect the public’s health. If any situation poses a 
threat the Department will be tfiere-if there is proof, if there is a connection (emphasis 
added).
So, the proof has to come first before you take action?
Absolutely. What does this facility do? Has it been proven to be hazardous? Is there any 
scientific evidence that there is any more danger just because its toxic [or is it ] that we 
all just don't want it? We don't get into the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) process. We 
deal with a scientific approach to issues along with looking at the community. Our role is 
that of standing in between and not getting caught in any side. Just because something is 
labeled "toxic" doesn't mean it is hazardous to public health.
In his opening statement, Dr. Jinadu establishes that the role of the Department 
is to protect public health. He makes it clear that health officials follow a specific code of 
conduct defined by their commitment to the practice of "science." In order to practice 
this scientific approach to public health, he argues that health officials must remain 
neutral, without taking any sides. Dr. Jinadu emphasizes this point throughout the 
remainder of the interview as he develops the argument that the Department's approach 
to public health must be objective in order to make sound public health decisions.
5 Ibid. Dr. Jinadu gave permission to record the interivew.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 0
His use of the term "threat" should be noted because It is followed by the clause 
—  "if there is proof, if there is a connection." If this phrase had been left out, one might 
conclude that he is using the term "threat" to refer to situations that contain the 
possibility or potential for a problem to occur. However, Dr. Jinadu explains that the 
Department will act on a situation only if there is "proof" that a threat exists. The 
Department's demand for scientific certainty is one of the defining characteristics of its 
toxics policy.
Do you think that there Is still a possib ility that environm ental 
contam inants caused the birth defects in Buttonwillow  even though the 
investigators could not prove there was a link?
Unless you have that data, unless anybody has that knowledge, you can't just conjecture. 
That’s not scientific. Only oo with known scientific data. Ten years from now you might 
find out that 'Oh yes the gasoline that we all use in our cars might cause birth defects.'
But we don't have the data now. And for all known data now and for all known information 
there is nothing to make a cause/effect relationship (emphasis added).
You have to meet certain criteria to come up with a cause/effect relationship. If you 
don't meet those you can't say it is a cause effect relationship. In that regard, just 
because you find these toxics here, and if you know that a toxic causes birth defects and 
you find birth defects in the community you might say 'Oh wait a minute there's a strong 
relationship here.' It’s still just a strong relationship. Because, let's say that the only 
way that science has documented that it causes that defect is by ingestion and there is no 
evidence that there was any ingestion in the subjects you've studied. You still can't make 
that leap can you? Even though you may have documented that particular toxic causes 
this defect, you still have to explain how it got there.
This question asks him to consider the "possibility" that environmental 
contaminants may have caused the birth defects. As he explained in his response to the 
previous question, the Department only recognizes a public health threat if there is 
proof; a "possibility" does not qualify as a "threat." A toxic facility does not represent a 
public health threat unless a causal relationship exists.
In the following dialogue, Dr. Jinadu is asked to respond to specific questions 
regarding the Rosamond investigation. In Rosamond, health officials found extensive 
contamination, and yet, Dr. Jinadu still claims that these facilities are not a public
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health threat until there is "scientific" proof; a "strong relationship" is not enough. At 
this point in the Department's reasoning, the question that many would raise is: If you 
know that these toxics are carcinogens, and you know that they are in the community, 
isn't a “strong relationship" enough to make the Department recognize these 
contaminated facilities as public health threats? Dr. Jinadu's responses to the following 
questions indicate that his answer is definitely "no."
In the investigation of Rosamond's childhood cancer cluster, many toxic  
fac ilities  w ere found to be operating in violation of the law. A lthough the 
investigators could not prove that exposure to these facilities caused the 
cluster, do you th ink these toxic facilities represented a public health  
t h r e a t ?
No, not necessarily. That's a by-product of that kind of investigation. It's just like, you 
know- How many people take their own bed sheets and mattresses and dump them on the 
sidewalks?
W ait. Let me make sure I understand. Would the Departm ent say that in 
th is case these fac ilities  represented a public health threat?
No. Because how do you declare a public health threat?
34 Sites were found which required further investigation. Fence and Post 
orders w ere given at many sites to protect the public from exposure to 
tox ic  chem icals. Reports of Violation were issued because hazardous  
w aste was being improperly stored, an above the ground ash pile was 
found with elevated levels of heavy metals and dioxin...
W hat i'm trying to say to you is - What has that caused? In other words, when you 
declare a public health threat what do you do ? Close down the town? (emphasis added)
Did the Departm ent believe that this was a public health threat to 
R osam ond?
Well when you say public health threat you are now talking about something that you 
know has jeopardized the life of the public.
Do you believe that it did?
No.
No you don't?
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No. Water has never been damaged. The water system has not been contaminated. Nobody 
has ever tested the air and said it was contaminated or otherwise everybody would be 
dying of cancer not just the children. There has been no food product that has been tested 
that people have consumed. So what is the definition of the public health threat? Let me 
point out to you at this point that there were 13 cases of cancer in McFarland. Has any 
toxic area been found? No. So what I’m trying to say to you is don't jump to conclusions. 
First of all those toxic wastes that were found you have not even researched when it is 
that it occurred. Was it before the law became more stringent? Was it after? Was it in 
between. Before you can jump and say quid pro quid, quid pro quid, you have to be able to 
prove. And it's all right to be sentimental about hazardous materials but when you are 
working in an environment like this, you have to be objective (emphasis added).
Dr. Jinadu argues that the air must not have been contaminated because no test 
results reached this conclusion, and if there was contamination "everybody would be 
dying of cancer not just the children." Joan Mckee, resident of 42 years, compiled a list 
of adults who had gotten cancer: "Without even trying I came up with a list of 40 
names...The people in Bakersfield (the Kern county seat) said they would be right out. I 
never heard from them again." In frustration she destroyed the list. About three months 
later she was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a form of cancer which attacks the white 
blood cells: "I got too sick to care any more. But I do believe my cancer is 
environmental."
Dr. Jinadu's reasoning goes beyond his initial argument that "scientific proof" is 
needed; he also needs to have proof in the form of widespread cases of cancer. He then 
raises the question: "So what is the definition of the public health threat?" He follows 
this question with the advice that one should not jump to conclusions about the 
significance of the toxic contamination. Once again he argues that you have to be able to 
prove a causal relationship. His reasoning reveals that he does not follow his own advice; 
when an investigation fails to uncover the cause, he "jumps to the conclusion" that the 
toxic contamination did not cause the cancer cluster. Although he argues that the toxic 
contamination does not represent a public health threat — unless there is scientific 
proof that it does — he cannot "prove" that the toxics are nol threatening public health.
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In fact, he would probably argue that it is not his responsibility to provide that type of 
evidence.
Determining who is shouldered with the burden of proof is an extremely 
significant issue in the toxics debate. Should the community be responsible for proving 
that toxics are a threat to public health, or, should the Department be responsible for 
proving that they are not hazardous? This question applies to many different situations, 
including the current struggle in Buttonwillow. Should the community have to prove that 
expanding the toxic dump would be hazardous to their health? And if they are left with 
the burden of proof, what type of proof would they have to provide? How many illnesses, 
cancers, or birth defects would it take to convince officials that the facility is a public 
health threat? The "burden of proof" issue will be addressed again in the following 
chapters.
So, if you saw data that showed a certain facility was em itting  
contam inants that it wasn't supposed to, that it was leaking, spilling on 
s i t e . . .
Shut it down. If you feel that way and its causing injury to the community, shut it down.
Although Dr. Jinadu answered quickly with the response "shut it down," he 
remains consistent with the approach that it would have to be "causing" injury to the 
public. There would have to be "scientific evidence" that the contaminated, leaking 
facility caused injury to the public. This approach guarantees that people must be 
harmed before taking action.
So once you have the proof then you take action?
That is correct It’s one thing to go rah rah rah. It's another thing to put the objective
facts together. The value of maturity in practice is the ability to pul all facts together 
and not get swayed by your own emotions. That is the value of maturity in practice. In 
particular, in public health, you can not be somebody who is going to exaggerate. You 
have to make very solid judgment calls that is going to be in the interest of the whole 
community not your own personal interest. And you cannot be blasé about it. And you can 
not be over-reactive about it. And a lot of people want us to be caught in either side. We
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cannot. We have to look at it from all sides and make very good, sound public health 
decisions.
May you live long enough to work in a local public health department and then you can 
put your idealism in there. But you'll find as 1 said to you that there are only certain 
steps that you can take. The steps you can take are based on a sound judgment not on an 
emotional high.
While Dr. Jinadu emphasizes the importance of making "objective" decisions, he 
devalues decisions based on an "emotional high." This perspective greatly influences his 
responses to the recommendations made by Padres and SKRAP. When he suspects that the 
comments are based on an "emotional high" he has justification for dismissing them.
Considering the cluster that occurred in Rosamond and the number of 
fac ilities  already in that town, should Rosamond be burdened with yet 
a n o th e r to x ic  fac ility ?
Why not? When you talk about toxics the idea is...because we use the word "toxic" or the 
word "hazardous" there are standards already set in place. EPA has a standard. Class 1 
hazardous material has its fingerprint, has its chemical nature, has agencies all the way 
from a local health department to the federal government assessing what the chemical is 
what the effects are, where should it be sited, should it be sited close to 35,000  
residents...All those things are standards which are set in. if you have these standards, 
and you are looking at these standards, people have come with those standards based on 
the knowledge of that particular material. Then we get so caught up in - I don't want it in 
my backyard because I know it is hazardous waste. That's not the job I'm in, O.K.? The 
job is to know what are those factors just described. Is the chemical class 1? What 
standards are there for its siting?
So you believe that as long as everyone follows the rules, the EPA and 
state have set up appropriate standards so that these facilities, if run 
correctly , do not pose a public health threat?
That's why we live by standards.
In these last two sets of comments. Dr. Jinadu expresses his faith in the 
"standards" developed by the EPA and the State. This trust in standards is consistent with 
his commitment to "science." In both cases there is a recognizable lack of questioning. He 
appears to be contradicting his earlier declaration regarding the importance of being 
objective and knowing all of the facts; recognizing that data gaps exist, that standards can
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be inadequate, and that regulations can be broken, are all facts that he should 
incorporate into his perspective and policy on toxics.
In Rosamond's case, studies were being done to see if there was a link 
w ith  the c luster and the toxic fac ilities . During the investigation , 
attem pts were made to sight yet another toxic faciiity  in that town. Can 
you understand why the community fought hard to stop this proposal?
Yes. That's understandable for the community, but if you ask me - Does this pose any 
more hazardous threat? - my answer is no. No, because there is no data for that.
Rosamond 's Cancer Cluster
In April 1986 the Department discovered a childhood cancer cluster in the small 
desert town of Rosamond, located at the southern end of Kern County.^ During the years 
1975-1984, nine children were diagnosed with cancer, the highest known childhood 
cancer rate in California.^ Only two of those children are alive today. Five of the 
children died of medulloblastoma, a rare cancer of the brain. According to statistical 
calculations made by state health officials, the rate is six times greater than the state­
wide average.®
6 The state defines a cancer cluster as a significantly larger than expected 
number of cancer casees occurring in one place during a specific time period. This 
cluster was discovered by accident when county health officials were reviewing records 
in search of more information about another childhood cancer cluster in the town of 
McFarland, California. See California Department of Health Services, Fact Sheet on the 
Rosamond Cancer Cluster: California Department of Health Services, Rosamond Update: 
Fact Sheet October 1988: Rosamond Update: Fact Sheet April 1989: and Rosamond 
Update: Fact Sheet June 1989.
7 California Department of Health Services, Fact Sheet on the Rosamond Cancer 
Cluster. Although nine children in Rosamond were diagnosed with cancer during the 
years 1975-1984, the state only recognizes 8 cases as part of the cluster because the 
ninth child lived greater than a mile away from the area where the other eight children 
resided. Many people in the community argue that the other child should be included in 
the cluster since he attended the same school.
® Ibid. According to the 1980 Census, there were 955 children in Rosamond at 
that time. The statistical probability that 8 cancer cases would have occurred by chance 
alone is 2/1000. The rate is 6 times greater than expected. The four medulloblastoma 
cases are also a cluster. The statistical probability that 4 cases would occur in a town 
the size of Rosamond by chance alone is 3/100,000.
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When the California Department of Health Services (DHS) joined the 
investigation in November of that year, the Environmental Epidemiology and Toxicology 
Section began to study the individual cancer cases to determine if they shared any 
common characteristics. The Toxic Substances Control Division (TSCD) assisted by 
investigating various sites in Rosamond and the nearby town of Mojave; officials 
identified 34 sites which contained levels of contamination that required further 
examination.
The early stages of the investigation revealed that state and local officials had 
very little information about these sites. According to Charles White, chief of the state's 
permitting unit, TSCD did not regularly inspect these sites because they were not 
licensed as hazardous waste generators: "Basically these facilities realty came to our 
attention in the past year and a half or so...We basically have been trying to get a handle 
on whether they do produce hazardous wastes and trying to determine if they do comply 
with the law and regulations." White pointed out that although these facilities are 
generating hazardous wastes, they might be slipping through a loop hole in the law which 
states that a permit is only required if hazardous waste is stored at the facility for more 
than 90 days, or if the material is being recycled or treated.®
At the local level, the assistant chief of the Kern County Air Pollution Control 
District (APCD), Cliff Calderwood, explained that the District does not have information 
about the extent of toxic contamination at these sites because APCD does not have the 
authority to regulate toxic emissions. APCD also has minimal control over what is 
burned in the furnaces, and no control over the management of solid wastes at these 
sites: "We've cited virtually all of them out there at one time or another for various 
types of problems, but we haven't looked at toxics. We don't have the authority to do so." 
Calderwood also drew attention to the fact that the owners of the sites may not even know
® Tony Knight, "Plants Lack Waste Permits," Dailv News 9 October 1988.
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what their facilities are emitting; "I don't know if those people know what it is they are 
burning half the time."^ °
Calderwood argues that Rosamond's problems are a direct result of the fact that 
Kern County's regulatory controls governing the burning and disposing of waste 
materials have historically been much weaker than those in nearby Los Angeles County. 
Since Rosamond is located only 85 miles north of Los Angeles' waste generators, 
Calderwood explains that the town became a "convenient dumping ground" for hazardous 
wastes from Los Angeles; "You are looking at 40 or 50 years of God knows what out 
there, and maybe now we’re paying for it. Until recently it was anything goes out there." 
Kenneth Hughes, hazardous waste specialist with TSCD, supports this claim; "I have 
never seen this much waste in one town before. The amounts and concentrations are 
alarming."^ "•
In October, 1988, the state published a fact sheet to update the community on the 
status of its investigation. The update provided summaries of the 34 sites, including 
information on the contamination that was found. The state identified 6 sites with 
elevated levels of dioxin, 20 sites with heavy metals (13 contained "elevated levels" of 
heavy metals), and 8 sites with semi-volatiles. There were nine sites where the state 
decided not to collect samples because "there was no indication of contamination."
Officials issued two Fence and Post orders, identified 11 sites that required additional 
sampling, filed Proposition 65 reports for 10 sites, and referred one site to the federal 
EPA for Fencing and Posting and containment of dioxin contaminated soils and waste.‘•2 
In April 1989, the state released another fact sheet to provide the latest 
information on the sites still under investigation. At that time the state announced that it
10 Ibid.
11 Louis Sahagun, "Rosamond; Malignant Mystery," Los Angeles Times 30 
September 1988, 1.
12 California Department of Health Services, Rosamond Update; Fact Sheet 
October 1988.
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had still not been able to find a medical link between the contaminated sites and the 
cluster. The state announced that the investigation would continue in order to determine 
whether clean up was necessary. In addition to studying the sites around Rosamond, the 
state also conducted tests which sampled soil, eggs and pork to see if dioxins had blown 
off sites and spread throughout the community.
In June 1989 the state published a fact sheet which contained the following 
results from these studies:
• Overall, the soil is safe. Only one location was found where the soil contained higher 
levels of dioxin in an amount that may be cause for concern. DHS is conducting more 
tests on that location.
• The pork sample contained no more dioxin than pork from a supermarket. The level 
is extremely low and is not a cause of concern.
• Chicken egg samples from three local backyards contained higher levels than those 
found in a supermarket. While the Rosamond supermarket eggs contained a dioxin 
level of .Ippt, the three sites had levels of 35.7 ppt., 3.2 ppt and 2.0 ppt. The state 
recommended that the residents at the site measuring 35.7 should not eat or sell the 
eggs, while the people at the other sites should limit their intake of eggs to 3-4 a 
week.
• DHS has found nothing to date that would connect dioxin exposure with any of the 
childhood cancer cases.
In this same Fact Sheet, DHS responded to the following question: What can DHS
tell us about the cancer risks from the industrial sites now?:
To date there have not been any unusual contaminants detected in the soil samples 
collected away from hazardous waste sites under investigation by the Toxics 
Substances Control Division. No unusual contaminants were detected in soil and 
water sample collected at locations where children with cancer spent time. These 
samples however may not be representative of air exposures that occurred 
during the years before the children developed cancer.
After commenting about the lack of data on air exposures, DHS explained that it 
hired two consulting firms to help estimate the amount of chemicals that people may 
have been exposed to before and during the time of the cancer cluster; one firm set up 
meteorological stations to collect information on wind speed and direction while the
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Other firm reviewed the industrial processes to estimate the amount of contaminants 
that may have drifted from the sites into the community. DHS explained that it will use 
this data to conduct its exposure assessment study: "DHS toxicologists will use the 
estimated exposures to calculate the theoretical cancer risk they pose to the community. 
These calculations will allow DHS to determine if the cancer risk from environmental 
contaminants is large enough to account for the childhood cancer c l u s t e r . " ^  3
When the investigation came to a close, TSCD provided a final summary of the
sites;
11 sites have been ordered by the Department (DHS) to Fence and Post their 
properties, 10 have complied. Those not in compliance face enforcement action;
4 sites have been referred to and accepted by the EPA for further stabilization; 2 
felony cases are being developed for referral to the Attorney Generals Office; 13 
generator inspections have been performed resulting in 12 Violation Notices...6 
of those served with Violation Notices have already voluntarily complied; those 
not in compliance ultimately will face enforcement action.
After the state conducted its investigation, Ron Baker, information officer for 
TSCD, declared Rosamond a "safe" place to live: "It's probably one of the safest places.
No other community in the state has undergone such an investigation.""''^ Although 
health officials concluded that whatever caused the cancers was either gone or never 
existed, some community members thought the investigation was inadequate. Roberta 
Bishop, one of the leaders of SKRAP, felt dissatisfied: "I don't think we have any answers. 
I'm disappointed. I just don't feel like we're getting the whole story...Maybe we won't 
ever know what caused those cases, but I want to know how things are now. Are my 
children safe?''"'^ She challenges the claim that Rosamond is a safe place to live: "How 
can it be safe? Dioxin causes cancer and they found dioxin. How can they say now that it
13 California Department of Health Services, Rosamond Cancer Studv Update 
June 1989.
1^ Nancy Weaver, "Cloud of Suspicion Splits Tiny Town," Sacramento Bee 24 
July 1989, A-12.
15 Mindy Taylor Lewis, "Questions remain in Rosamond," Antelope Valley Press 
16 June 1989, A-6.
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didn't cause the cancer cluster? When you tell people it's safe, I wonder how much of it 
is for the developers?"^®
Dave Kiefer, owner of a local feed store and member of SKRAP, expressed his 
frustration with the investigation: "I feel like I've run up against a big tremendous wall 
and there's nothing to do...We're concerned about the health and safety of everyone even 
if they don't like it." Carol Raanes, a mother who considered moving to protect her 
children raised the point that there are others in the community who are eager to put an 
end to the investigation and the testing: "The old timers in town want everybody to shut 
up. They want it over with. Rosamond is growing so fast they'll cover it over."^^
While many in the community expressed their frustration with the 
investigation, there were others who felt differently; Bob Matley of the Rosamond 
Chamber of Commerce was happy with the results: "Yes, we are happy with the results 
and, yes we are ready to put this behind us. It appears to be winding down. The 
Developers are all back on the job." For some residents the investigation supported their 
theories that there was never really a problem in the first place; Art Landsguard, 
owner of Karl's Hardware and Century 21 real estate business in town, argued, "There's 
no proof we have an extra-large incidence of cancer here, "while his son and other 
business leaders offered another explanation: "It's a possibility that drug abuse is the 
cause." A mother of one of the victims vehemently disagreed while pointing out that her 
child was three and a half years old when she was diagnosed with Wilm's tumor, a type of 
kidney cancer, These comments demonstrate the diversity of perspectives in the toxics
f® Weaver, "Cloud of Suspicion Splits Tiny Town," A-12. See Sahagun, 
"Rosamond: Malignant Mystery." — The state's investigation and initial findings did 
affect development projects in Rosamond. Rosamond was growing steadily as developers 
saw the opportunity to accomdate the needs of people from Palmdale and Lancaster, two 
of the fastest growing cites in the country. Kaufman & Broad the largest home builder in 
California halted plans to build a multimilion dollar proposal to build 700 homes on 
127 acres in Rosamond until the results were in from the state's investigation. Since 
1984 when the last cancer was diagnosed, the town has grown from 4,000 to 15,000. 
f 7 Ibid.
f® Sahagun, "Rosamond: Malignant Mystery," 3.
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debate; while some residents challenged the investigation, others were satisfied with the 
results. The following section discusses some of these different perspectives in more 
detail.
The Rosamond investigation followed a particular pattern and order of events: 
health officials discovered (by accident) a cancer cluster that triggered an investigation; 
the investigation revealed elevated levels of toxic chemicals, some of which were known 
carcinogens; health officials searched for the cause of the cluster but they could not find 
any "scientific" proof that a link existed between the contaminated sites and the cluster; 
the cause was never found and health officials declared the town "safe." Many residents 
were left with unanswered questions and a feeling of frustration. This pattern is not an 
isolated example; during the years 1981-1992, the California Birth Defects 
Monitoring Program completed 99 studies, and in the seven cases where officials 
discovered an "unusual excess" of birth defects, they were unable to identify the cause.
In Kern County, the Department has been involved in three investigations —  Rosamond, 
Buttonwillow and McFarland —  where the health officials could not prove that 
environmental contaminants caused the clusters.
This pattern persists because the primary role of health officials in these 
investigations is to "scientifically prove" that specific environmental contaminants 
caused a certain cancer cluster, birth defects cluster, or other health problem 
associated with exposure to toxic chemicals. If they are unable to prove that a link 
exists, they conclude that the community is "safe" from the threat of toxics. In the 
Rosamond investigation health officials expressed confidence in the results of their 
investigation: "It is probably one of the safest places. No other community in the state 
has undergone such an investigation."19
This conclusion indicates that health officials use the following reasoning: if an 
investigation cannot prove that exposure to toxic chemicals caused the problem, then the
19 Weaver, "Cloud of Suspicion Splits Tiny Town," A-12.
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community is "safe." Heath officials base this type of reasoning on the assumption that a 
public health investigation is capable of proving a link between the contaminated toxic 
facilities and the cluster. In the Rosamond investigation there are several reasons why it 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish this link. At best, health 
officials had extremely limited data on the toxic facilities. They did not have the answers 
to the following questions: What toxic chemicals were being used, produced or released 
during that time?; What volume of toxics were the facilities emitting?; Did any spills, 
accidents, or illegal discharges occur?; If so, when? These questions only represent a 
partial list of the unknown variables in this investigation; health officials also had no 
way of accounting for all of the factors that may have affected when, where or how a 
child was exposed.
In addition to the unknown variables associated with this particular 
investigation, data gaps also exist that affect any public health investigation associated 
with toxics. The data gaps are due to the inadequate testing of chemicals currently on the 
market; many of these toxic chemicals are being used even though they have not been 
tested for their potential to cause a variety of health problems, including cancer, birth 
defects, endocrine disruption, damage to the nervous system, and damage to the immune 
system. For example, there are more than 50,000 chemicals already in commercial use 
that have not been tested for their ability to cause birth defects. In addition, more than 
500 new chemicals are introduced into commercial use each year^O Tests are also not 
done on the possible synergistic and cumulative effects of these chemicals. Scientists 
simply do not know the complete profile of these chemicals. As a result, health officials 
make decisions and policies without a true understanding of the possible consequences of 
their actions. Although health officials are aware of the data gaps, they remain loyal to 
this approach to toxics. The earlier review of the Department's toxics policy
20 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects...Part 2; Why Birth 
Defects Will Continue to Rise," Rachel's Environmental & Health Weekly 4 1 1( 13 
October 1994).
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demonstrated that the Department shares this approach; in fact, Dr. Jinadu argues that 
it is the responsibility of all public health officials to base their actions and decisions on 
the presence or absence of "scientific data."
Summary
Dr. Jinadu's interview reveals that the Department bases its decisions, actions 
and policies on the "objective" facts revealed through the practice of “science." One 
must not "conjecture," "jump to conclusions," "exaggerate," "over-react" or make 
decision based on an "emotional high." The Department will not define a situation as a 
public health threat unless there is "scientific" evidence that establishes a causal 
relationship. This policy on toxics places the burden of proof on community groups like 
Padres and SKRAP to demonstrate that the toxic facilities in their communities caused 
the various illnesses. In other words, toxic sites are innocent until proven guilty.
The question that remains is: How has the Department's toxics policy affected 
Padres' and other community groups' fight for environmental justice? Do these groups 
feel that the Department is living up to its commitment to protect public health?
It will become clear in the next chapter that Padres and SKRAP both have serious 
concerns about the role of the Department in their communities; one of the primary 
problems is that a cancer cluster, birth defects cluster or other serious illness has to be 
reported before any action is taken by the Department. As a result of this policy, there 
is no commitment to illness prevention through toxics use reduction or other pollution 
prevention measures. Interviews were conducted with Rosa and Stormy to give them an 
opportunity to evaluate the Department. Their comments and recommendations appear in 
the following chapter.
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Chapter 4 
Evaluation of the Kern County 
Public Health Department: A Grassroots Perspective
Although there are a variety of ways to evaluate the Department, the purpose of 
this chapter is to establish how the Department performs with respect to community 
concerns. Interviews were conducted with the leaders of two grassroots community 
groups from Kern County —  Rosa Solorio-Garcia of Padres and Stormy Williams of 
SKRAP.'* In order to gain important background information regarding their previous 
experiences with the Department, they were asked to respond to the following questions: 
1) What relationship do you and your group have with the Department?; and 2) What 
role does the Department play in your community? The chapter concludes with a list of 
Rosa's and Stormy's recommendations for the Department. Their comments and specific 
recommendations reveal that their perspectives towards toxics are significantly 
different from that of the Department.
Relationship with the Department 
P a d r e s
Padres does not have a formal relationship with the Department, and since the 
group has had no direct interactions with the Department, the question was modified to 
read as follows: Would Padres be willing to establish a working relationship with the 
Department? Do you think it would be beneficial? Is it feasible?
Rosa described why a relationship with the Department could benefit her 
community:
 ̂ Rosa Solorio-Garcia, personal interview by author, 10 November 1994. 
Stormy Williams, phone interview by author, 4 January 1995.
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For Latinos, if it is information about their health or about their children, 
especially their children, they are going to go. The majority of the people 
involved in this are involved because they want something better for their 
children. There's nothing more important than their children. Latino families in 
Buttonwillow don't have money. They don't have luxuries. The most important 
thing in their lives are their kids.
At the same time, she questioned whether establishing a relationship with the 
Department would be feasible. One of the barriers she identified was the lack of time:
If I were a full-time housewife with access to a phone and was able to establish 
relationships with the Health Department and agencies involved in the permitting 
process, then I would say- yes, it is feasible to set up a workshop on the 
different health risks or just one on what the Department can do for a 
community. But I think the way we do things, we only react to what happens. We 
don't have long term goals because we are all full-time workers.
She explained that the group was able to work with more people when Lupe 
Martinez from California Rural Legal Assistance was helping them organize. He helped 
arrange for people from California EPA and others to come to Buttonwillow: "He made 
them aware that we existed. They came to my house and talked to the group and we were 
able to ask them questions. "
Later in the interview, Rosa identified another barrier that would affect the 
feasibility of establishing a working relationship with the Department. She explained 
that she would have to consult the group "to see if it was a risk they would be willing to 
take." At this time in the interview, Rosa was discussing the group's concern about lead 
exposure in the community. One of the members of Padres had been to a clinic to get her 
three year old daughter examined. The nurse asked whether she wanted her daughter 
tested for lead exposure and although she didn't know what that meant, she agreed to the 
testing. The nurse told her that there was a problem because her child had a blood level 
of "12." The mother wanted to know what to do but the nurse explained that the 
Department could not conduct further investigations until the child tested at a high level
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three consecutive times. The mother left the clinic extremely upset with many 
unanswered questions that she brought to Rosa.
Rosa and this woman have been talking about possible ways to protect her child 
from further exposure but Rosa explained that lead is a very sensitive subject, one that 
could potentially create problems if Padres decided to seek assistance from the 
Department:
If we said that we wanted an investigation to see about lead exposure, and then 
they found that most of the houses had lead, the town's going to turn against us 
because there is nowhere else to live. And the farmers are going to turn against 
us because we are upsetting their farm workers who live in their ugly old houses 
even though they have lead. We're still being rebel-rousers. I mean, I don't care 
but I think the other guys (member of Padres) who live in company houses...1 
don't know whether people would rather expose their kids to lead or whether 
they're just happy they have a home to live in...But I think people need to be 
informed and the Health Department should be doing that.
The lead issue reveals the complexity of the problems that face communities like 
Buttonwillow. Lead is more than just a health issue. People are faced with a choice; Lose 
your home or poison your children? This is one more example of how the unequal 
distribution of political and economic power affects farmworkers and other 
disempowered population groups. Within this context, understanding the role of the 
Department becomes more difficult. Although the Department paints a very black and 
white picture to demonstrate how it bases its decisions and policies on the objective 
practice of "science," Padres and SKRAP both feel that political pressures greatly 
influence the Department. Political pressures and their effect on the Department are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
SKRAP
Stormy's first contact with the Department occurred in 1986 when public health 
officials came to her house to test the water. When Stormy began to ask questions, they
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gave her "very vague responses' and wouldn't tell her whv they were conducting tests. 
They informed her that they would contact her with the results. After waiting weeks 
without hearing from the Department, she decided to call. The first time she called, she 
got "the total run around. ' She called a second time and was still given no response to her 
inquiry. According to Stormy, the third time she "got belligerent" and was finally told 
that her water was "o.k.."
Approximately two years later she had a communication with Dr. Jinadu which 
resulted in a strained relationship that has lasted to this day. She contacted the 
Department in search of a risk assessment document; the document concerned a cement 
company that was given a conditional use permit to burn toxics for a year in the nearby 
town of Mojave. This permit was approved without an Environmental Impact Report or 
public hearings; as Stormy explains, it was "snuck in." When she asked Dr. Jinadu to 
send her a copy of the risk assessment document, again she "got absolutely the total run 
around." He questioned her reasons for wanting the document and suggested she try to 
contact the company or the contractor. She didn't want another list of people to call 
especially because she knew that the company and the contractor were not required by 
law to provide her with the document. She did feel, however, that the Department was 
obligated as public health employees: "I explained [to Dr. Jinadu] that this is a health 
related issue. The town already has the largest [childhood cancer] cluster and now 
they're trying to add another toxic facility which would add 40,000 tons of toxics per 
year to our air."
He told her to call others, and if she still couldn't get the paper, she could call 
him back. She replied, "No sir. I will not be calling you back because I will not have any 
reason to deal with you in the future." She further explained in the interview: "That is 
the type of attitude, We're getting paid to be public servants but don't bother us.' "
After that experience she spoke to others who had interacted with Dr. Jinadu. 
They told her that he typically spends a lot of time visiting clinics to immunize children;
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they argued that he should be spending more time concentrating on improving public 
health policies. Stormy responded:
I think its good that any kind of doctor stays in touch with the grassroots. But 
when you have 7 dead kids here and a big cluster in McFarland and another one 
brewing up the road in Earlimart and you’ve got toxic sites all over the place...! 
don't think he's ever been up here to have a tour of these sites. I don’t think he 
cares. And I don’t think these people want to be out in the dirt. I think they want 
to be in their offices. They don't consider our feelings. And when you are going to 
start to add toxics into an area where we've got all these kids dead and you can't 
even get a member of the public an important piece of paper, I just find it 
ridiculous. And I have nothing to do with that person. He'll come and sit next to 
me in meetings and I'll just pretend he's not there because I just feel this is such 
an unconscionable attitude, and how do people like that get these jobs anyway?
The experience with Dr. Jinadu made a lasting impression on Stormy, one that 
makes her turn away from the Department as a potential source for assistance: "Because 
of that experience with Jinadu, I certainly wouldn't have gone to Bakersfield to enlist 
their aid because I felt like they were totally out of it."
What Role Does the Department Play in Your Community?
P a d re s
Rosa could only recall one time that the Department became involved in the 
Buttonwillow community: "Dr. Jinadu, he came out here and right off he said that he 
didn't think Laidlaw had anything to do with the birth defects in Buttonwillow. We asked 
if he had done any studies and he said, no.” Dr. Jinadu visited around the time that the 
California Birth Defects Monitoring Program was called in by the state to investigate the 
birth defects cluster in Buttonwillow.
Rosa explained that Dr. Jinadu's comment in support of Laidlaw and the state's 
study that failed to find the cause of the birth defects made Padres' lose credibility in the 
community: "We tell them that Laidlaw is bad, that these kinds of health problems are 
happening and we feel that it is because of Laidlaw. The Department came and did a study
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but none of it showed that it was Laidlaw. So they (Buttonwillow residents) didn't 
believe us after that." In fact, Padres feels that the opposite message was sent: "Once 
they came in, it just gave Laidlaw added fuel because now they have a study which showed 
that Laidlaw was a good company."
Although the birth defects cluster triggered a study by the state, Padres initially 
wanted the local Department to conduct a needs assessment in Buttonwillow that would 
examine all of the major health problems in the community; Padres was aware that it is 
extremely difficult to prove that exposure to toxics caused the birth defects. 
Nevertheless, with respect to toxics, Rosa wants them to address the issue even if they 
don't have absolute proof:
I would want them to say if there are chemicals that can cause birth defects by 
smelling them, if they're in the water, whatever, I want them to say that to the 
community. I would want them to hold an informational meeting. It would have to 
come from the Health Department saying that these are possibilities- Once you 
know these things are possible, would you still want Laidlaw there?
In the interview, Rosa concluded that the Department is not in touch with the 
Buttonwillow community, and that it doesn’t care :
The role of the Department in Buttonwillow has been zero....My thing is, they 
don't want people to know there are problems, like all the lead in homes, because 
the majority of the homes are owned by farmers in Buttonwillow. They're owned 
by businessmen who are going to complain to the Department. So if all these 
people in low-income housing don't know about it, they won't complain to 
anybody and they'll live there forever. Who cares? 1 just think it is another way 
of oppressing people.
SKRAP
In Stormy's opinion, the Department did the "very minimal" amount of work in 
the investigation of the cancer cluster, especially considering this was the worst 
childhood cancer cluster in the state. Soon after the cluster was discovered, the
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Department backed out for financial reasons and the state and federal agencies took the 
lead. Stormy questions the priorities of the County:
I'm disappointed in the County. I know that one or two or three of them would 
show up at the meetings the state held and they'd come all duded up and sit and 
listen and kind of make an appearance. But as far as I know they were always 
playing poor. And then they go ahead and build that huge new building for the 
Supervisors and the administrative offices with marble. And I feel that 7 dead 
kids are a higher priority than black marbled bathrooms.
When asked if the Department is still involved with the Rosamond community, 
Stormy replied that she was unsure: "there may be a few still skulking around."
She continued to discuss Dr. Jinadu: "He wants to be in touch with every day people but 
wouldn’t he want to come and look at these sites, go through the paper work and see how 
this happened and figure out how to avoid it. To my knowledge I don't know what those 
people in Bakersfield know."
Although the Rosamond investigation came to an end, parents still go to Stormy 
in search of answers, explanations about what could have killed their children. Stormy 
feels that these parents have a right to get these answers from their public health 
officials: "I would pay for someone from the Department to take a tour. Maybe they could 
speak to some of these parents because we have very haunted people here. I find it 
unconscionable that we can't get a report, any interest shown, any compassion shown for 
any of these families."
Recommendations
The following recommendations were compiled from comments made by both Rosa 
and Stormy.
1 ) Develop and implement a policy/strategy to address toxics. This policy towards 
toxics should officially recognize toxic facilities as a public health threat and 
support pollution prevention and toxics use reduction.
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2 ) Be a resource for grassroots groups who are seeking Information on toxics and other
environmental health related problem such as lead exposure.
3 ) Hold public meetings in the impacted communities to provide residents with the
opportunity to ask questions and express their concerns regarding toxic facilities 
and other public health problems.
4 ) Become more active in the permitting process. When grassroots groups are
attempting to stop the siting or expansion of toxic facilities, attend public hearings 
to provide information about potential health problems associated with exposure to 
toxics. Adopt a precautionary approach to toxics which recognizes that exposure to 
toxics represents a public health threat even if hard scientific data hasn't linked 
specific health problems with a specific facility.
5 ) Become more accessible to members of grassroots groups who are trying to promote
illness prevention and toxics use reduction in their communities. Currently, 
members of these groups feel no connection with the Department and are unaware of 
the Department's role in their community. The Department should communicate with 
these groups to determine how the two parties can create and sustain effective 
working relations. Public health officials should visit the community, meet with 
community leaders, and take a tour of the toxic facilities.
6 ) Assign a person to deal specifically with toxic-related issues. The employee would be
responsible for maintaining files containing information on the toxic facilities in 
each community. The files would keep records regarding: 1) the name and amount of 
all the chemicals at each site; 2) the name and quantity of chemicals being stored, 
treated, and emitted ; 3 )the regulatory record of each facility including information 
on violations, accidents, spills etc. The employee would also be responsible for 
keeping the Department updated on any proposals for siting a new toxic facility or 
expanding an existing facility. In addition, the employee would stay in direct contact 
with the state and federal agencies involved in the regulation of these facilities. The 
data collected about these facilities would be extremely useful if a cancer cluster or 
other health problems appeared.
7 ) Conduct follow-up investigations in communities that have suffered from cancer
clusters, birth-defect clusters or other health problems that are suspected to be 
linked to exposure to toxic chemicals. This follow up work should include providing 
counseling services to the parents and families who are suffering from the loss of a 
family member or friend. These people often have questions that have not been 
answered and they could benefit from a meeting with pubic health officials.
Summary
Both Padres and SKRAP believe that the Department should be doing more to 
support the goals of toxics use reduction and pollution prevention. They reason that the 
Department is obligated to address this issue since its mission is to protect public 
health. The lack of absolute "scientific" proof should not be used as an excuse for non­
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action. Padres and SKRAP believe the Department should play a more active role in their 
communities. Rosa feels that the Department's role has been "zero" in her community, 
while Stormy's experiences have left her with the impression that the Department 
doesn't have any compassion or concern for her community.
The testimony from Rosa and Stormy challenge the fundamental arguments made 
by the Department in the previous chapter. Is illness prevention really the 
Department's highest priority? If so, does the Department's toxics policy achieve this 
goal? Is the Department committed to its stated mission to "build and foster strong 
partnerships for health" with the communities it serves? If so, why are the 
Department's relationships with Padres and SKRAP so strained? Is there a chance that 
the Department and Padres can develop an effective working relationship? These 
questions are examined in more detail in the following chapters.
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Chapter 5 
The Department's Response
This chapter contains the Department's responses to the recommendations made 
by Padres and SKRAP. The Director of the Kern County Public Health Department, Dr.
Jinadu, agreed to participate in a recorded phone interview in order to accurately 
present his opinions. There were a few times that additional questions were raised to 
clarify his position. These questions along with the recommendations appear in bold. The 
responses to these recommendations are direct quotes from Dr. Jinadu.
1) D evelop and im plem ent a policy/strategy to address toxics. This policy 
tow ards toxics should officially recognize toxic fac ilities  as a public  
health threat and support pollution prevention and toxics use 
r e d u c t io n .
The County has a strategy and policy towards toxics. However, it is not in the best 
interest, or it is prejudicial to assume that all toxics are quote unquote public health 
threats. Within standards and within acceptable measures the Department and the 
County will evaluate each facility and determine the potential of such toxics.
Do you see any barriers that would make It d ifficu lt for the 
D epartm ent to perform  such duties?
No I don’t see any barriers. But I also don't think it’s appropriate to just give a carte 
blanche definition or request that every situation be declared a public health threat.
That is very impractical and very prejudicial. It's also appropriate to make it clear 
that none of these recommendations are anything new. The County is doing everything 
along those lines. But at the same time, what is perceived as what should be done and 
what should actually be done may be two different things.
Padres and SKRAP want the Department to adopt a precautionary approach that 
recognizes toxics as a threat to public health. The main message in this recommendation 
is the need for the Department to develop a toxics policy that will focus on preventing 
tragedies like the one experienced by Rosamond's residents. Communities shouldn't have 
to suffer from cancer clusters and other serious illnesses to get attention from health
6 3
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officials. Making efforts to clean up toxic contamination after the fact is not enough; Rosa 
and Stormy want the Department to address the long term goal of pollution prevention.
Dr. Jinadu's response to this recommendation does not address the issue of 
pollution prevention and toxics use reduction. Instead, he is quick to imply that the 
Department's current policy is adequate because the Department and County will 
evaluate each facility . He remains firmly committed to his argument that toxics are not 
a public health threat unless there is scientific evidence to prove a causal relationship. 
As a result, his statement, "within standards and within acceptable measures," means 
that facilities will not be evaluated unless there is proof they have caused a problem in 
the community.
When Dr. Jinadu argues that it would be impractical and prejudicial to "declare" 
all toxic facilities a public health threat, I suspect that he misunderstood Rosa's and 
Stormy's point. To "declare" and to "recognize" represent two very different actions; 
Rosa and Stormy want the Department's actions and policies to reflect an understanding 
that these facilities are potentially dangerous to public health. They want the 
Department to learn from tragedies like the one experienced in Rosamond instead of 
continuing to assume that all toxics facilities are innocent until proven guilty.
While Rosa and Stormy have clearly expressed that the Department needs to 
change, Dr. Jinadu's responses indicate that he is confident in the Department's current 
approach to toxics. He gives no indication that change of any kind is necessary; in fact, he 
claims that the Department already addresses the needs defined by Rosa and Stormy: "It's 
also appropriate to make it clear that none of these recommendations are anything new. 
The County is doing everything along those lines."
2) Be a resource for grassroots groups who are seeking inform ation on 
toxics and other environm ental health related problem  such as lead 
e x p o s u re .
The Department as well as the County have always been a resource for grassroots 
groups. And we have provided information to anybody who needs information. And at
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anytime they can call on us and as a matter of fact, if issues come up we are always 
the first to provide information to the community through news releases or any such 
materials to the media as well as to the community groups in specially called 
meetings.
W ould the groups have to come to the Department or call you or does 
the  D ep artm en t...
If there is an issue, we are usually the first to alert the community. And based on 
that we call meetings and indicate that we need to provide information. Or some of 
our news releases, which often get picked up by the media, will also direct 
individuals and groups if there is any need for further information to the 
appropriate numbers.
So, for the firs t two recom m endations, you feel that the Departm ent is 
already meeting those needs?
We've always been doing both. We don't do what they want is a different thing. But 
providing objective information and an objective approach to issues, we've always 
done that.
Although Dr. Jinadu continues to assert that the Department has "always been a 
resource for grassroots groups," Rosa and Stormy strongly disagree. While Rosa has 
never considered the Department to be a resource, Stormy's primary reason for 
distrusting and disliking Dr. Jinadu is based on the fact that he did qoî provide 
"information to anybody who needs information."
His next claim —  "If there is an issue, we are usually the first to alert the 
community" —  misses the point that Rosa and Stormy are trying to make with respect to 
the importance of illness prevention through toxics use reduction; alerting the 
community to health problems after they have already affected the community is not good 
enough, especially when dealing with toxics. Stormy would be able to challenge his claim 
since the Rosamond cancer was discovered by accident.
In his last response to this recommendation he clearly states that he can't just do 
what Rosa and Stormy want him to do because he must make "objective" decisions. The 
line that he draws between his "scientific" approach versus their "emotional" demands 
is reflected in almost all of his comments. It is his way of justifying the Department's
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approach to toxics without having to directly address the issue of illness prevention 
through toxics use reduction and pollution prevention.
3) Hold public meetings in the Impacted com m unities to provide residents  
w ith the opportunity to ask questions and express their concerns 
regard ing  toxic fac ilities  and other public health problem s.
The Department has always done that when issues arise.
If Buttonw illow  residents wanted to ask questions about health hazards 
associated with toxics, would the Departm ent be w illing to hold a 
m e e tin g ?
W e did that in Buttonwillow very specifically if their memories serve them right.
You know I was right in the middle of it along with state staff. We held meetings. We 
tended to questions. And that’s always been the approach."'
Have you held other meetings or was that the only one?
You don’t hold meetings just for the sake of holding meetings.
But if they had more questions?
They should contact us and we would be glad to talk to them. We are not adverse to 
holding meetings. But at the same time I'm not going to schedule a meeting every 
month.
So If they contacted you...
W e would be more than willing, the Department has always been available. We 
always put out news releases. This Department is very visible. But at the same time 
this Department is not just going to provide answers that people just want if they 
are not based on scientific facts or appropriate public health measures. The 
Department has to be objective. That's the main point. The Department has to do what 
the Department has to do. But at the same time we tend to the whole community and 
anybody in the community has access to this Department.
Dr. Jinadu's stated willingness to talk and meet with community members 
represents a potential opportunity for grassroots groups that they might want to 
consider pursuing. Stormy, for obvious reasons, would question the sincerity of Dr.
"I The meeting Dr. Jinadu refers to was the one held by the State regarding the 
Birth defect study done by California Birth Defects Monitoring Program.
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Jinadu's offer, wtiile Rosa would be faced with the problem of gaining access to a meeting 
place.
Based on Rosa's and Stormy's experiences, it is not clear whether he would keep 
his word. Although Dr. Jinadu once again speaks with confidence about the accessibility 
of the Department, he still follows with the explanation; "But at the same time this 
Department is not just going to provide answers that people just want if they are not 
based on scientific facts or appropriate public health measures." While he claims that 
the Department is willing to meet with community, he also continues to draw the line 
which separates his "objective" approach from people who "just want" certain answers. 
His stubbornness about this issue suggests that he might not be very receptive to 
comments from the community, especially if there is talk about implementing a 
different approach to toxics.
4) Becom e more active In the perm itting process. W hen grassroots  
groups are attem pting to stop the siting or expansion of toxic  
fa c ilitie s , a ttend public hearings to provide In form ation about 
potential health problems associated with exposure to toxics. Adopt a 
precautionary approach to toxics which recognizes that exposure to 
toxics represents a public health threat even if hard scientific  data 
hasn 't linked specific  health problem s w ith a specific  facility .
Once again the Department will have to make objective determinations and this 
recommendation is unacceptable because they are asking us to ignore specific facts 
just to do what they want. I can't do that. At the same time, the Department, public 
health departments, are advocates, not just for the poor, for the rich, to protect the 
community. So, facts that protect the community are what the Department will tend 
to but it is unacceptable and really illegal to just go in and say that you are going to 
take your own personal measures. So what the Department will do will be something 
that is objective.
Dr. Jinadu's interpretation of the recommendation —  "they are asking us to 
ignore specific facts just to do what they want" — requires further examination because 
Rosa and Stormy could easily argue that they are asking him to do just the opposite. 
Instead of asking him to blindly "ignore specific facts just do what they want," they want 
him to recognize M  of the facts, including the fact that data gaps exist, the fact that
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standards are not always adequate, and the fact that regulations can and have been 
broken. Nothing in the recommendation suggests that he should base his approach on his 
own "personal measures." In fact, Rosa and Stormy simply want him to tell the whole 
story about toxics including the fact that many of these toxics are known carcinogens.
This isn't information that Rosa and Stormy are inventing because they are overly 
emotional; it is "objective" information that they want him to communicate to decision­
makers involved in the permitting process.
5) Become more accessible to members of grassroots groups who are
try ing to prom ote illness prevention and toxics use reduction in their
com m unities. Currently, members of these groups feel no connection  
with the Departm ent and are unaware of the Departm ent's role in their 
com m unity. The Departm ent shouid com m unicate with these groups to
determ ine how the two parties can create and sustain effective  
w orking  re lations. Public health offic ia ls  should v is it the com m unity, 
m eet w ith  com m unity leaders, and take a tour of the toxic facilities.
We've taken the tours of the facilities. We've met with them. Again, if there is any 
way to increase the level of understanding of the role of public health, we'd be glad to 
do that. We are not adverse to meeting with groups and we'd be glad to do that. Again, 
we don't have any list of what groups are out there but at the same time, once we 
know, and we know the need, we always try to meet the need. And we'd be glad to do 
that.
Have you taken a tour of the sites in Rosamond?
I've been everywhere. I've been to Rosamond, to McFarland...That's what the 
Department has always done. We have always been there. We've always visited the 
place even other places where there has been lead...We've been there. We've given 
information to the community. We've met with the residents. There is an approach, a 
policy which we take in any of these issues. Again, it's always been that people don't 
feel like we’ve done enough or done anything. But at the same time, just because 
someone wants us to say or come to a conclusion that favors them, that is something 
we cannot do. We have to be objective. The key word 1 want to emphasize is 
"objectivity."
Once again Dr. Jinadu strongly asserts that the Department has always been there 
for the communities. In addition, he claims that "if there is any way to increase the level 
of understanding of the role of public health, we'd be glad to do that." Rosa's and Stormy's 
previous comments clearly demonstrate that the "level of understanding" needs to be
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increased; Rosa's lack of experience with the Department has left her with little 
knowledge of the Department's role in her community, while Stormy was willing to pay 
someone from the Department to take a tour of the facilities. Although Dr. Jinadu states 
that there is an approach the Department takes which includes meeting with community 
members and touring facilities, it appears that the Department's path rarely intersects 
with grassroots community groups. This is not surprising considering the Department 
has no list and no knowledge of the grassroots groups In these communities. Although the 
Department might visit the community and tour the facilities, it needs to make the effort 
to meet specifically with members of grassroots groups because they are most involved 
with issues of toxics in their communities.
6) Assign a person to deal specifically with toxic-related issues. The 
em ployee w ould be responsible for m aintaining files containing  
in form ation on the toxic facilities in each com m unity. The files would  
keep records regarding; 1) the name and quantity of all the chemicals  
at each site; 2) the name and quantity of chemicals being stored, 
treated, and em itted ; 3) the regulatory record of each faciiity  
inc lud ing  in form ation on violations, accidents, sp ills  etc. The  
em ployee would also be responsible for keeping the Departm ent 
updated on any proposals for siting a new toxic facility  or expanding  
an existing facility . In addition, the em ployee would stay in direct 
contact with the state and federal agencies involved in the regulation  
of these facilities. The data collected about these facilities would be 
extrem ely useful if a cancer cluster or other health problem s  
a p p e a re d .
That Is impractical. Within the budget realms you cannot have just one person doing 
things. In this day and age people do more with less. My resources cannot 
accommodate just assigning one person to one job. I have people doing ten different 
types of jobs.
Would It be feasible for a person to pick up some of these 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ?
W e don't keep any specific data but there are places we can get it when we need to. So 
that's appropriate...CDC (Center for Disease Control) is a resource, the state is a 
resource. So, in other words, information is there. And if I have an issue in 
community "x" I can call toxics at the state level and say give me data on this.
Information is right at every one's fingertips. To assign a person to do that is a 
resource we just don't have.
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Stormy developed this recommendation because she wants the Department to be 
better prepared; she wants the Department to actively take steps to prevent another 
Rosamond tragedy. Dr. Jinadu's response indicates that he has faith in the current 
regulatory system and its ability to provide him with the appropriate information 
whenever it is needed: "Information is right at every one's fingertips." The Rosamond 
investigation clearly demonstrates that this is simply not true. Prior to the 
investigation, very little was known about these sites. Charles White, chief of the state's 
permitting unit explained that the Toxic Substances Control Department does not 
regularly inspect these sited because they are not licensed as hazardous waste 
generators: "Basically these facilities really came to our attention in the past year and a 
half or so...We basically have been trying to get a handle on whether they do produce 
hazardous wastes and trying to determine if they do comply with the law and regulations" 
The State's lack of knowledge about the Rosamond sites contradicts Dr. Jinadu's claim 
that he can get the appropriate data whenever needed. Stormy argues that this is the 
information the Department should have on file.
7) Conduct fo llow -up Investigations in com m unities that have suffered  
from  cancer c lusters , b irth -defect clusters or o ther health problem s
that are suspected to be linked to exposure to toxic chemicals. This 
fo llow  up w ork should include providing counseling services to the 
parents and fam ilies who are suffering from the loss of a fam ily
member or friend. These people often have questions that have not 
been answered and could benefit from a meeting with pubic health
o f f i c i a l s .
Again, when you spend 5 years investigating a cluster, how much follow up do you 
have? You cannot keep this open forever.
How about survivors? Do you do any follow up?
What kind of follow up? We don't do primary care. What kind of counseling are we 
going to give. That is something they can have with their own primary care provider. 
That's not a role, no public health department plays that role. Again, it's one thing to 
expect but at the same time let's be real. When you spend four years investigating 
Rosamond and McFarland, I don't know what follow up you need. At the same time, in 
Buttonwillow there is no link, and this assumes there is a link. I want to quickly 
dispel that there is no link. So what link are they talking about "when suspected to be
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linked to toxic chemicals?" There is no link. So I think that needs to be reflected in 
the record.
W hen you say that there Is no link, do you think that the scientific  
studies these days are capable of stating, w ith 100% certainty, that 
there Is no link?
The key words are "these days" and "100%." Let's take that out of our dictionary. 
There is nothing in life that is 100%.
So, it is possible that there Is still a link?
No. Again, we're coming from different angles. All I'm saying is that what you know 
today is what you know today and if you cannot prove anything, all right. But if you 
are waiting for 100%, life is not 100% so let's be real. O.K.?
Dr. Jinadu argues that it is not the Department's responsibility to offer 
counseling services because the Department is not a primary care provider. He also 
questions the need for follow-up work since the investigation lasted for 5 years. 
Stormy's point is that parents who have suffered the loss of a child still have questions 
that haunt them; if health officials from the Department participated in such a long 
investigation, wouldn't they be more qualified than a private counselor or doctor to 
answer questions about the cancer cluster?
Dr. Jinadu points out that this recommendation assumes the health problems are 
linked to toxics; he is quick to have the record reflect that there is no link in 
Buttonwillow. Once again, his actions are dictated by the presence or absence of 
"scientific " evidence. When he is asked to consider the possibility that "science" may not 
be capable of proving such a link, he explains, "There is nothing in life that is 100%." 
This is just the point that Rosa and Stormy are trying to make; from their perspective, 
this understanding should convince health officials to take a precautionary approach 
when dealing with toxics-related health issues. Instead, Dr. Jinadu accepts the 
limitations of science; he is clearly satisfied with the Department's approach to toxics 
and sees no reason to change the status quo.
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Summary
The major points that appear throughout the recommendations are the following; 
1) The Department needs to adopt a precautionary approach to toxics that supports its 
stated mission to protect public health. This approach must be based on a commitment to 
illness prevention through toxics use reduction and other pollution prevention 
measures: 2) The Department needs to improve communication networks throughout the 
communities: most importantly, the Department should establish a connection with the 
grassroots groups so that ideas, information and resources can be exchanged.
When Dr. Jinadu responded to these recommendations, he explained with 
confidence that there is no need to change or even question the Department's current 
approach to toxics. Instead, he argues the following: 1) the Department has always been 
there for the communities: 2) the Department already has a toxics policy that is based 
on objectivity and the practice of science: and 3) the Department is sensitive to the 
needs of the community although it cannot simply provide them with the answers they 
want.
The following chapter examines the implications of the Department's toxics 
policy in order to answer the central research question: How does the Department's 
toxics policy affect Padres' struggle for environmental justice?
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Chapter 6
Implications of the Department's Toxics Policy
The central research question remains, how does the Department's toxics policy 
affect Padres' struggle for environmental justice?
In the previous chapters, Dr. Jinadu argues that the Department bases its actions 
and decisions on a "scientific" approach to public health. This commitment to the 
practice of "science" is reflected in its toxics policy according to which toxics do not 
represent a health threat unless scientific evidence establishes a causal relationship. In 
other words, toxic substances are innocent until proven guilty.
Before examining the effects of the Department's toxics policy on Padres, this 
chapter provides background information on the current standards and regulations 
governing hazardous waste management. Although there are many ways to evaluate a 
regulatory system —  Do the regulations establish appropriate standards? Are they 
enforceable? Are there loopholes that people can exploit? —  this section evaluates the 
standards and regulations by examining the scientific practice of risk assessment upon 
which they are based. It is important to understand the risk assessment process because 
it directly shapes the Department's toxics policy.
Following the background discussion, this final chapter argues that the 
Department's toxics policy directly undermines Padres' efforts to achieve 
environmental justice for the following two reasons: 1) the policy makes the 
Department less accessible to grassroots community groups as a potential source of 
information and support; and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goal of illness 
prevention.
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Background
Dr. Jinadu believes that toxic facilities are not inherently hazardous because 
federal and state standards have been developed to protect public health; he reasons: 
"That's why we live by standards." When asked whether towns like Rosamond should be 
burdened with another toxic facility, he answered: "Why not?...because we use the word 
hazardous or the word toxic there are standards already set in place...based on the 
knowledge of that particular material."^
The National Research Council (NRC)^ does not share Dr. Jinadu's confidence in 
the current federal and state standards; in a report investigating the effect of hazardous 
waste on public health, the NRG reached the following conclusion: "The legislative 
mandates, policies, and programs of the federal and state agencies that currently manage 
hazardous-waste sites are inadequate to the task of protecting public health."3 The NRG 
found this to be true even in the management of Superfund sites; some of the major 
conclusions from this part of the investigation stated the following: 1)public health 
effects of exposure to hazardous waste sites have not been adequately assessed because 
remediation is the top priority rather than the assessment of public health risks; 4 2) 
data on exposures and health effects are inadequate because during the past ten years less 
than one percent of the estimated 4.2 billion [dollars] spent to evaluate Superfund sites
f Dr. Jinadu, telephone interview by author, 17 February 1995.
2 Members of the National Research Council are drawn from the councils of the 
National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of 
Medicine.
3 The National Research Council, Environmental Epidemioloav: Public Health and 
Hazardous Wastes (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991), 69 [hereinafter 
NRG, Environmental Epidemioloav].
4 Ibid., 6-7. "Analyses of the limited federal and state regulatory support for 
environmental epidemiology reveal, however, that the intent of Congress in creating 
Superfund has not been realized, in that the public health consequences of exposures to 
substances from hazardous-waste sites have not been adequately assessed...The 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) notes that efforts to assess 
candidate NFL sites typically relegate public health concerns to a minor role; the 
process as a whole is directed at remediation, rather that at the assessment of public 
health risks."
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were used to examine health risks;^ and 3) the health of nearby residents could be 
threatened because there is no system of managing hazardous sites that incorporates the 
early assessment of health risks.®
The NRC report presents several shortcomings in our government's approach to 
the management of hazardous waste. The following section argues that the scientific 
process upon which the regulations and standards are based — risk assessment —  is a 
weakness that contributes to the fact that the regulations and standards governing 
hazardous waste do not adequately protect public health.
Risk Assessm ent
The ERA and state agencies employ a scientific process called risk assessment to 
manage the production, use, treatment, storage and disposal of toxic chemicals. The 
human health risk assessment (HRA) process typically includes the following steps:
"1) hazard identification - determination of whether a pollutant adversely affects 
human health; 2) dose-response assessment - determination of the relationship 
between the level of exposure and the probability of occurrence of adverse effects;
3) exposure assessm ent - determination of the extent of exposure; and 4)rlsk
5 Ibid., 257. "During the past ten years, less than one percent of the estimated 
4.2 billion spent each year on hazardous waste sites in the U.S. has been used to evaluate 
health risks at Superfund sites. As a result, existing data on exposures and health effects 
are inadequate either to support decisions on the management of hazardous waste sites or 
to allow the conduct of epidemiologic investigations of the health impact of these sites."
6 Ibid., 258. "At NPL sites where potentially critical exposures are detected, 
there is no regular application of an adequate system of early assessment of the health 
risks involved or the need for interim action to protect the health of exposed 
populations. The failure to construct a system for managing hazardous waste sites that 
incorporates the early assessment of health risk means that the health of nearby 
residents could be imperiled. Moreover the conditions for development of environmental 
epidemiology are adverse and impede the development of useful scientific investigations 
of many important questions."
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characterization - description of the nature and often the magnitude of risk, 
including the accompanying uncertainty."^
In addition to health risk assessments, there is another step to the risk 
assessment process called "quantitative risk assessment" (QRA). QRA attempts to 
provide a more specific calculation of the threat of toxics to human health by assigning a 
number to measure the damage caused by exposure to certain chemicals or sources of 
pollution. The calculations are used to determine the number of additional cases of cancer 
that would result when a number of people are exposed to a certain concentration of a 
single pollutant. QRA involves the following steps: "1)Evaluating whether a specific 
substance or substances increase the incidence of a disease; 2) Estimating the types and 
amounts of pollutants released; 3) Estimating what concentration of pollutants may be 
transported to the point of exposure; and 4) Estimating what extra exposure risk to that 
concentration might exist (e.g., one extra cause of cancer in a million people exposed).
QRA is employed to answer many difficult public and environmental health 
questions. What types and quantities of toxic chemicals can be discharged into the soil, 
water or air? What are “acceptable” human exposure levels? While decision-makers 
characterize QRA as providing scientific answers to these questions, it is important to 
understand the limitations of this process. The following section analyzes the various 
weaknesses of QRA.
W eaknesses of Q uantitative Risk Assessment
The major weakness of QRA is that a significant amount of uncertainty is present
in the majority of its measurements and calculations. As a result, many important
 ̂ United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Risk Assessment.
1 9 9 2 .
8 Robert Ginsburg, "Quantitative Risk Assessment: The Illusion of Safety," 
Fvervone's Backyard. 9:1 (August 1991): 18.
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decisions are based on assumptions and estimations. Some of the sources of this
uncertainty include:
• Data Gaps — The majority of toxic chemicals have not been tested to determine 
their effects on humans and the environment; the resulting lack of data —  "data 
gaps" —  limits our understanding of the possible hazards associated with most 
chemicals currently in use. In addition, more than 500 new chemicals are 
introduced into commercial use each year.9 The United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) evaluated EPA's chemical testing program and confirmed that the 
data gaps are extensive.^®
• Single dose-response testing — Scientists use QRA to evaluate a single 
chemical's effect on human health and the environment; QRA does not take into 
account the fact that people are exposed to more than one chemical at any given time. 
By ignoring the reality of multiple exposures, QRA does not protect the public from 
the cumulative effects of toxic chemicals; although test results may conclude that a 
person can be exposed to a certain amount of chemical "x" for a specified length of 
time without being harmed, testing is not done to determine the effects of an 
exposure to chemical "x" in addition to chemicals "a" through "z." QRA also ignores 
the possibility that multiple exposures may lead to synergistic effects; synergistic 
effects occur when two or more chemicals interact to produce an effect that is more 
hazardous than the sum of their individual effects. Very few chemicals have been 
tested for their potential to interact with other chemicals.'' ^
• Sensitive populations -- QRA assumes people are equally sensitive to exposure 
to toxics. This is an oversimplified approach because there are many individual 
differences that can increase the risk, including, age, sex, inherited traits, diet, 
pregnancy, and overall state of health. In general, children are at a much greater 
risk than adults.12
9 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects...Part 2: Why Birth 
Defects Will Continue to Rise," Rachel's Envkonmental & H_e_aJtJh Weekly 411( October 
1 9 9 4 ) .
10 United States General Accounting Office. Toxic Substances: EPA's Chemical 
Testing Program Has Not Resolved Safety Concerns (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, GAO/RCED - 91-136, 1991), 2. "EPA has made little progress in 
developing information on the safety of the thousands of chemicals that affect our daily 
lives and has not taken action to regulate , or warn the public about, chemicals found to 
be harmful. Since TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) was enacted in 1976, EPA has 
received health and environmental results on only 22 chemicals and assessed the results 
for 13 of these chemicals. Under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 the 
Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to require industry to test 
potentially harmful chemicals. Depending on the results, the EPA can regulate or ban the 
use of chemicals found to be hazardous to human health or the environment."
11 Hazard Evaluation System & Information Services (HESIS), Understanding 
Toxic Substances: An Introduction to Chemical Hazards in the Workplace (California 
Occupational Health Program. Berkeley, CA, 1986).
12 Ibid.
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Unregulated substances — Non-conventional pollutants (NCPs) refer to the 
unidentified and unregulated chemicals in our environment. Since we have no 
knowledge of these pollutants, they add to the uncertainty in any calculation 
regarding the potential threat of toxics.^ 3
Extrapolation from models -- Since scientists are not allowed to experiment 
directly on humans, the majority of data used in QRA calculations is gathered from 
experiments on lab animals. As a result, models are needed to extrapolate the 
chemical's effect on lab animals into the probable effect on humans. Interpreting data 
from these models contributes to the uncertainty of QRA results for two main 
reasons. First, chemicals do not affect all species to the same degree; some species 
are more sensitive than others depending on the chemical and the dose. Variation in 
chemical sensitivity exists not only between humans and lab animals, but also among 
the different species of lab animals used in the experiments. Second, in order to keep 
costs at a minimum, many of the experiments work with doses that are much higher 
than those encountered in the human environment. A variety of models are used to 
extrapolate probable low-dose effects from the high-dose bioassays. Although most 
models yield similar results when examining high-dose effects, models using low- 
doses can vary by three or four orders of magnitude.
The significant weaknesses of risk assessment provide valid reasons to question 
the continued use of this scientific process. Should we trust a process based on 
incomplete data, estimates, and assumptions to answer important questions that directly 
and significantly impact the health of humans, non-human species and the environment? 
It is crucial to understand that the Department advocates current standards and 
regulations governing the management of toxics within the context of profound 
uncertainty.
The remainder of this chapter argues that the Department's toxics policy directly 
undermines Padres' efforts to achieve environmental justice for the following reasons:
1) the policy makes the Department less accessible to Padres as a potential source of
13 NRC, Environmental Epidemioloav. 10. "There is evidence that NCPs are a 
potentially important source of hazardous exposure. Some preliminary toxicological 
studies suggest that NCPs have important biological properties, environmental 
persistence, and mobility...In the broadest sense these unidentified, unregulated 
substances represent a risk of unknown magnitude. The absence of evidence of their risk 
is solely the result of the failure to conduct research; it should not be misconstrued as 
demonstrating that NCPs and "inert" pesticides components are without risk."
14 Steven A. Broiles, "Health Risk Assessments: A Critical Scientific Technique 
for Environmental Regulators and Litigators," Los Angeles Lawver (March 1994), 37.
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information and support; and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goals of illness 
prevention.
A cce ss ib ility
Local health departments are often the primary or only source of health care and 
information in low-income and rural communities. In order to effectively serve the 
needs of these communities, local health departments must be culturally and 
economically accessible to the surrounding communities. The Department's mission 
statement addresses this goal of accessibility by directing the Department to "maintain 
culturally appropriate education and public health promotion efforts" and "improve the 
quality and cultural competency of the Department's operations, services and 
programs." However, it is not enough just to make services available to the public; in 
order to achieve the goal of accessibility, the Department must actively reach out to the 
communities to stay in touch with their needs, concerns and questions. The following 
mandate of the Department's mission identifies the importance of outreach by 
establishing that it is the Department's responsibility to "build and foster strong 
partnerships for health with local public/ private health and social service agencies, 
community based organizations, consumers, educational institutions and other interested 
community groups.
Did the Department "build and foster" a strong partnership with Padres? 
According to Rosa, the "role of the Department in Buttonwillow has been zero."^^ 
Considering the fact that the Department has never heard of Padres, it is obvious that the 
Department has not formed a strong partnership with this group. Instead, the 
Department's involvement with the Buttonwillow community has had the opposite effect; 
while Padres worked to educate the community about the potential health hazards 
associated with Laidlaw's dump. Dr. Jinadu's announcement that the dump did not cause
15 Kern County Public Health Department, "Mission Statement."
Rosa-Solorio-Garcia, personal interview by author, 10 November 1994,
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the birth defects sent a message to the community that directly challenged the validity of 
Padres' position. Many chose to believe the Department, and as a result, Padres lost 
credibility in its community.
The Department has also not taken steps to "build and foster" a strong 
partnership with SKRAP. When Dr. Jinadu failed to send Stormy the risk assessment 
document she requested, his lack of cooperation and confrontational attitude convinced 
her that SKRAP would not benefit from a partnership with the Department: "Because of 
that experience with Jinadu, I certainly wouldn't have gone to Bakersfield to enlist their 
aid because t felt like they were totally out of it." Stormy also has the impression that 
the Department doesn't care about her community: "I don't think he's ever been up here 
to have a tour of these sites. I don't think he cares. And 1 don't think these people want to 
be out in the dirt. I think they want to be in their offices. They don't consider our 
feelings. ^
It is important to note that Dr. Jinadu has taken a tour of the sites. The fact that 
Stormy was unaware of his visit to her community provides testimony to the lack of 
communication and partnership between the Department and SKRAP, especially 
considering the fact that Stormy has given many tours of the toxic facilities, including 
tours to state health officials; she went so far as to state: "I would pay for someone from 
the Department to take a tour. Maybe they could speak to some of these parents because 
we have very haunted people here. I find it unconscionable that we can't get a report, any 
interest shown, any compassion shown for any of these families."^®
•The condition of the Department's relationships with Padres and SKRAP strongly 
suggests that the Department has not effectively translated its written commitment to 
the goal of accessibility into practice. The fact that the Department does not keep a 
record of the grassroots community groups in Kern County also leads one to suspect that
17 Stormy Williams, telephone Interview by author, 4 January 1995.
18 Ibid.
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the Department's relationships with Padres and SKRAP are not exceptions to the rule; 
there is a good chance that the Department is unaware of the existence of a significant 
number of community groups.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect the Department to have "strong partnerships 
for health" with every community group in Kern County. However, SKRAP's experiences 
with the Department reveal that the Department often fails to communicate with these 
groups, and without this most basic connection, the possibility of developing 
partnerships is slim at best. And if the Department gives community leaders the 
impression that it is unwilling to offer information and assistance, they, like Stormy, 
will become unwilling to work with the Department.
H ealthy C ities  Pro ject
Although it is clear that the Department has failed to develop partnerships with 
Padres and SKRAP, one should not conclude that the Department intentionally avoids 
working with community groups. Dr. Jinadu claims that the "Department as well as the 
County have always been a resource for grassroots groups," and "if there is any way to 
increase the level of understanding of the role of public health, we'd be glad to do that." 
The Department is currently involved in a project —  the Healthy Cities Project — which 
supports Dr. Jinadu's claim that the Department is committed to working with 
community groups.
The international "Healthy Cities Project" emerged in 1986 as a joint initiative 
of the Health Promotion and Environmental Health programs in the European Regional 
Office of the World Health Organization (WHO). The Project was intended to address the 
long term goal of “Health for All by the year 2000" in which all people would benefit 
from "a level of health which allows them to lead socially and economically productive 
lives." The Healthy Cities model focuses on "process for community improvement.
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Resident participation in determining health needs as well as devising and implementing 
solutions is the cornerstone of the Healthy Cities approach. The public and private 
sectors of the community are also vital partners in this process." In general, the model 
"conceptualizes community health in its broadest dense, to include the physical 
environment, economic conditions, and the social climate within the city."'’ ^
The Project has attracted participants from all over the world including 35 
European cities; many of the European cities are national networks for their countries, 
and as a result, hundreds of cities world wide are involved. In addition, there are 
national networks in the United States, Canada and Australia.^o
The California Department of Health Services is the first and only state health 
agency which funds a Healthy Cities Project. The California Healthy Cities Project is 
managed by the Western Consortium for Public Health , a non-profit independent 
organization which represents the Schools of Public Health and Extension Divisions at 
the University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles. In order to become a California 
healthy city, the following requirements must be met: "1) passage of a city resolution 
that endorses participation in the project and reflects commitment to the healthy cities 
concept; 2) identification and recruitment of local steering committee members 
representing a broad cross section of the community; and 3) submission of a project 
description and a one-year work plan."^^
The California Healthy Cities Project brochure explains that a "high priority of 
many healthy cities initiatives is the empowerment of residents who —  for reasons of
19 Western Consortium for Public Health, California Healthv Cities Project 
(Sacramento, CA, 1992).
20 In the United States, the National Healthy Communities Initiative supports the 
Healthy Cities Project by operating a clearinghouse for information; providing advice 
and resources to start local and statewide projects; organizing national and regional 
conferences; and publishing newsletters. The National Healthy Communities Initiative is 
jointly run by the National Civic League, based in Denver, Colorado and the United States 
Public Health Service.
21 Joan M. Twiss, "The Healthy City: An Idea Whose Time Is Right," Western Citv 
(October 1991): 2.
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poverty, low levels of education or English language skills —  may previously have lacked 
the knowledge, skills, and opportunity to improve their own health."22 a  brief 
description of a few of the programs is included to provide a better understanding of 
some of the healthy cities' goals and accomplishments;
• Monterey Park - This city initiated a program called LAMP (Literacy for all 
Monterey Park) to serve its population which is 65% Asian and 35% Latino. The 
program works with 300 functionally illiterate adults and people needing tutoring 
in English as a Second Language. The program is run by a staff of approximately 100 
volunteers.
• Escondido - La Vida Buena Coalition in Escondido received a three year grant from 
the California Department of Health Services to work on the development and 
implementation of culturally appropriate health promotion programs to address the 
major diseases affecting the city's Latino population. The Coalition conducted a needs 
assessment and a survey of 305 Latino residents, and developed programs to increase 
physical activity and promote nutritional education.
• Rohnert Park - There were two main projects initiated in this city. The 
first was the passage of a 100 % smoke-free restaurant ordinance; the 
"Tobacco-Free Business Project" received an $150,000 grant which was 
used to provide 500 local businesses with free educational materials, self- 
help guides, assistance in developing worksite policies, and smoking cessation 
classes. The second project was a survey of over 120 individuals which 
asked the people to express their health concerns and needs in addition to any 
barriers that might stop them from using the services. Community members 
formed an advisory committee and California State University, Sonoma 
provided technical assistance. The survey defined the following needs: a 
supervised activity center for youth, a coordination of substance abuse 
education, treatment and prevention programs, and a multi-service center to 
provide one-stop access for health and human services.
The Kern County Health Department has made a commitment to support cities 
that want to participate in the Healthy Cities Project: "The Department will provide 
technical assistance to communities to form coalitions, assess community needs, 
determine project goals and plans, design a marketing or media plan, develop program 
materials, plan program events, develop public policy, or in any way that is needed."23
22 Western Consortium for Public Health, California Healthv Cities .Project 
(Sacramento, CA, 1992).
23 Department's literature on Healthy Cities Project. Photocopied.
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The Project directly addresses the goal of accessibility. The Department's 
involvement demonstrates that it does work with community groups in an attempt to 
develop "strong partnerships for health." The question remains, why has the 
Department failed to achieve the goal of accessibility in the case of Padres and SKRAP? 
This question can be answered if one revisits the Department's mission statement. The 
mission directs the Department to "build and foster strong partnerships for health;" it 
is clear that the Department needs to actively pursue connections with communities. 
Although Dr. Jinadu states that the Department is "more than willing" to work with 
community groups, a distinction needs to be made between actively initiating 
partnerships, versus passively being "willing" to work with community groups. As 
Rosa's and Stormy's comments have demonstrated, the Department is not initiating 
contact with grassroots groups. As a result, the Department’s passive approach places 
the responsibility of initiating a relationship on grassroots groups like Padres.
There are several reasons why it is difficult for groups like Padres to initiate a 
relationship with the Department. First, grassroots community groups often exist on 
very few resources including time and money. During her interview, Rosa testified that 
limited resources directly shape Padres' perspective and approach to problem-solving: 
“...I think the way we do things, we only react to what happens. We don't have long term 
goals because we are all full-time workers." Rosa explained that she rarely has an 
opportunity to make phone calls much less initiate a relationship. Second, language and 
cultural barriers can make members of grassroots groups feel uncomfortable initiating 
relationships with people holding positions of power. Rosa explained that her culture 
teaches women not to question anybody or anything. The final reason is that many 
residents are not familiar with the Department's mission, programs and services 
because the Department has played such a limited role in Buttonwillow; as a result, it is 
unlikely that residents would think of turning to the Department as a potential source of
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assistance or information. For example, neither Padres nor SKRAP is aware that the 
Department participates in the "Healthy Cities Project."
Although Rosa identified reasons why it would be difficult for Padres to initiate a 
relationship with the Department, she explained that a relationship would be beneficial:
Definitely. For Latinos, if it is information about their health or about their 
children, especially their children, they are going to go. The majority of the 
people involved in this are involved because they want something better for 
their children. There's nothing more important than their children. Latino 
families in Buttonwillow don't have money. They don't have luxuries. The most 
important thing in their lives are their kids.
Although the Department claims it is willing to work with community groups, 
and although Padres believes that a relationship with the Department would be 
beneficial, a partnership has not developed because neither the Department nor Padres 
has initiated contact. Instead, they function in isolation without sharing ideas, concerns, 
or strategies. How does the Department's toxics policy contribute to the dynamic of this 
relationship?
D epartm ent's  Toxics Policy
The Department's toxics policy intensifies this dynamic because it magnifies the 
polarization between "experts" such as the Department, and "non-experts" like Padres. 
As "experts," the Department practices a scientific approach to public health that 
focuses on gathering and interpreting statistically significant numbers and "objective" 
data. As "experts" they use their scientific findings to define what qualifies as a public 
health threat. As "experts" they design and implement public health policies. However, 
as "experts" they perform these scientific tasks in isolation, and as long as the 
Department remains isolated from the communities it serves, the Department will fail 
to achieve the goal of accessibility.
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The Department's policy Intensifies the isolation, magnifies the polarization, and 
makes the Department less accessible to grassroots community groups like Padres 
because it promotes the continued use of a "scientific," risk assessment-based, 
decision-making arena that is guarded by very rigid borders; while these borders allow 
"expert" people, perspectives, and problem-solving strategies to enter the arena, “non­
experts" and their ideas are excluded and devalued. The language spoken within this 
arena is highly technical; it was invented by "experts," for “experts." The dialogue 
revolves around mathematical models, statistically significant numbers, and scientific 
analysis. This exclusive arena makes it extremely difficult for "non-experts" to 
participate in the decision-making process;
EPA has also effectively cut out public participation by reducing the risk 
discussion to a technical calculation which requires technical expertise to do the 
calculations and to argue over the basic assumption in the risk assessment. 
Furthermore the public is put on the defensive by seeming to oppose good, 
"state-of-the-art" s c i e n c e . 24
Although this exclusive, "scientific" arena is surrounded by very rigid borders, 
the grovyth of the grassroots environmental justice movement reflects the fact that an 
increasing number of "non-experts" are exercising their right to participate in the 
decision-making process. Once inside this arena, however, "non-experts" are faced with 
the daunting challenge of affecting an approach to public health even more rigid than the 
borders created to defend it. This approach dictates that there is a right way and a wrong 
way to practice public health; while the "expert," "scientific" approach is deemed valid, 
any other approach is devalued.
The Department's toxics policy promotes this inflexible approach to public 
health; it draws a solid line between "experts" and "non-experts," and at the same time 
predetermines that the "scientific" approach is the only valid and correct approach to 
public health. Dr. Jinadu believes that the Department makes sound, "objective" public
24 Robert Ginsburg, "Quantitative Risk Assessment" 19.
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health decisions based on "science," while "non-experts," tend to "conjecture," "jump to 
conclusions," or make recommendations based on an "emotional high." Opinions and 
recommendations from the "non-expert" public, including Padres, are automatically 
devalued because they do not use the same technical scientific language, they are not 
based on mathematical models, and they do not have statistically significant data to prove 
with certainty that toxics caused the health problems in their community.
A review of Dr. Jinadu's response to the following recommendation made by 
Padres and SKRAP provides insight into the Department’s opinions of the "non-expert" 
approach to public health:
Becom e more active in the perm itting process. When grassroots  
groups are attem pting to stop the siting or expansion of toxic  
fa c ilitie s , a ttend public hearings to provide inform ation about 
potential health problems associated with exposure to toxics. Adopt a 
precautionary approach to toxics which recognizes that exposure to 
toxics represents a public health threat even if hard scientific  data 
hasn 't linked specific  health problem s with a specific  facility .
Once again the Department will have to make objective determinations and this 
recommendation is unacceptable because they are asking us to ignore specific facts 
just to do what they want. I can't do that. At the same time, the Department, public 
health departments, are advocates, not just for the poor, for the rich, to protect the 
community. So, facts that protect the community are what the Department will tend 
to but it is unacceptable and really illegal to just go in and say that you are going to 
take your own personal measures. So what the Department will do will be something 
that is objective.
Dr. Jinadu argues that this recommendation is "unacceptable" because it would 
require the Department to act in a way that is not objective: "they are asking us to 
ignore specific facts just to do what they want...it is unacceptable and really illegal to 
just go in and say that you are going to take your own personal measures." The 
Department's toxics policy and its attitude toward the "non-expert" approach to public 
health allow it to dismiss the recommendation without carefully evaluating its validity. 
Is Dr. Jinadu's interpretation of this recommendation accurate? Are Padres and SKRAP 
really asking the Department to "ignore specific facts just to do what they want?"
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Instead of asking the Department to ignore facts, It appears entirely likely that 
Padres and SKRAP are advocating that the Department consider alt of the facts: it is a 
Iâ £ i that data gaps exist; it is a fast that the risk assessment process is riddled with 
uncertainty; it is a fact that standards are not always adequate; and it is a fact that 
regulations have been and will continue to be broken.
Rosa explained that she wants the Department to inform her community about the 
potential health hazards associated with exposure to toxics :
I would want them to say, if there are chemicals that can cause birth defects by 
smelling them, if there in the water, whatever, 1 want them to say that to the 
community. I would want them to hold an informational meeting. It would have to 
come from the Health Department saying that these are possibilities- Once you 
know these things are possible, would you still want Laidlaw there?25
Although Dr. Jinadu argues that "non-experts" "jump to conclusions," 
"conjecture," and make recommendations on an "emotional high," Padres' concern that a 
potential link exists between exposure to toxics and birth defects is legitimate; in fact, 
there is "objective," "scientific" data that support this position:
There is abundant scientific evidence that birth defects in laboratory animals and 
humans have occurred as a result of exposure to four classes of pollutants; 
radiation, pesticides, toxic metals (including lead, mercury, cadmium), solvents 
and dioxin-like chemicals including PCBs. Because municipal landfills and toxic 
waste dumps are laced with pesticides, toxic metals, solvents, dioxin-like 
compounds, and sometimes even radio-active materials, at least seven studies 
have now reported finding unusually high numbers of birth defects in children 
born to parents residing near d u m p s . 26
Padres and SKRAP want the Department to consider these facts when developing 
and implementing public health policies regarding toxics. They also want the Department 
to share this information with the public and with decision-makers. Their 
recommendation is consistent with the Department’s stated mission to conduct public 
health education and outreach. However, the Department's toxics policy and its emphasis
25 Rosa Solorio-Garcia, personal interview by author, 10 November 1994.
26 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects."
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on scientific certainty does not allow the Department to practice this approach to public 
health unless there is scientific proof that a causal relationship exists.
This demand for "scientific" certainty or proof has intensified the isolation and 
magnified the polarization between the Department and the communities it is mandated to 
serve:
These different conceptions of risk inevitably lead to misunderstandings and 
distrust. Many scientists and regulators are contemptuous of public perceptions 
of risk and readily characterize public perceptions as being wholly out of touch 
with reality.2 7
The Department's policy magnifies the polarization between "experts" and "non­
experts" and, as a result, the Department is failing to achieve the goal of accessibility. 
This conflicts directly with the mission and responsibility of local health officials. By 
not being accessible, the Department is not in touch with community concerns and needs. 
In addition to the fact that the Department's toxics policy makes it less accessible to 
grassroots groups like Padres, it also hinders Padres struggle for environmental justice 
because it directly conflicts with the goal of illness prevention.
Illness Prevention
In the broadest sense, the Department's mission is to protect public health. The 
Director of the Department's Division of Health Promotion and Public Information, Dr. 
Manzoor Massey, describes the mission in further detail: "Public health means 
prevention and that has to be the bottom line in all of our operations. Otherwise, we re 
in the wrong business." He continues to explain that illness prevention is the
27 John P. Dwyer, "The Limits of Environmental Risk Assessment," Boalt Hall 
Transcript. (Based on an article to be published in the Journal of Energy Engineering, 
Decem ber 1990): 22-23.
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Department’s top priority: "Absolutely. No doubt about it. Without prevention you are 
only giving lip service."2 8
Although the Department's commitment to illness prevention is clearly 
expressed in its mission statement, it is not reflected in the Department's toxics policy. 
The Department's toxics policy does not promote illness prevention for two main 
reasons: 1) the Department does not recognize a situation as a public health threat 
unless there is scientific evidence that proves a causal relationship; the Department's 
demand for scientific certainty guarantees that people must be harmed before any action 
is taken; and 2) the Department’s toxics policy supports the practice of pollution 
control instead of toxics use reduction. Since the Department's policy does not promote 
illness prevention, it is not consistent with its overall mission to protect public health.
" S c ie n t if ic  C e rta in ty "
Dr. Jinadu explained throughout his interviews that the Department must have 
scientific certainty or proof before taking action: "If any situation poses a threat, the 
Department will be there - if there is proof, if there is a connection ... Is there any 
scientific evidence that there is any more danger just because its toxic (or is it ) that 
we all just don't want it?... Just because something is labeled "toxic" doesn't mean it is 
hazardous to public health'29 (emphasis added).
The Department remains committed to this approach even though it is incredibly 
difficult, if not impossible, to find the cause of illnesses suspected to be linked with 
toxics. This was clearly demonstrated in the investigation of Rosamond's childhood 
cancer cluster. In a report that examined public health and hazardous wastes, the 
National Research Council reached the same conclusion: "The world of epidemiology, like 
that of any human science, seldom permits the elegant inferences to be drawn about
28 Dr. Manzoor Massey, personal interview by author, 17 November 1994.
29 Dr. Jinadu, telephone interview by author, 17 February 1995.
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causation. The object domain of epidemiology consists of numerous uncontrollable 
aspects, with considerable variations.''^0
Identifying the causes of chronic illnesses like cancer and birth defects is 
exceptionally challenging. Chronic illnesses often have a long latency period which 
means that there is a delay between the beginning of an exposure and the noticeable 
symptoms of the illness. As a result, it could take weeks, months, or years for the 
illness to be recognized; this latency period makes it very difficult and often impossible 
to link the illness with a specific chemical, a specific exposure level and a specific 
tim e.^ 1
Even though public health officials recognize the difficulty in establishing a 
causal relationship, the Department still bases its decisions on the presence or absence 
of scientific proof. This perspective is directly opposed to the goal of illness prevention 
because it guarantees that people will be harmed before the Department even initiates an 
investigation. A weekly newsletter published by the Environmental Research Foundation 
discusses the implications of this approach on the rate of birth defects: "A society that 
demands scientific certainty before it will restrict the use of suspected teratogens 
guarantees that the rate of birth defects will continue rising. Scientific certainty about 
anything involving humans, is, and will remain, elusive and r a r e . " 3 2
Pollu tion  Control versus Toxics Use Reduction
Pollution control and toxics use reduction (TUR) are two competing hazardous 
waste management strategies. While pollution control techniques manage pollutants after 
they have been discharged into the environment, TUR techniques prevent pollution by
30 NRC, Environmental Epidemiology. 4.
31 Hazard Evaluation System & Information Services (HESIS), Understanding 
Toxic Substances.
32 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects."
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eliminating or reducing the volume and toxicity of the chemicals used in the production 
process.
This section begins with a background discussion to further introduce and define 
these two strategies. TUR will then be examined in more detail to demonstrate why this 
approach more effectively protects public health. Finally, this section briefly reviews 
the political tension that surrounds the toxics debate to better understand why the 
Department does not promote toxics use reduction.
Background
In 1976, the EPA issued a policy statement to define the government’s approach 
to the management of hazardous waste; reducing waste at the source was established as 
the highest p r io r i t y .D u r in g  the 1980's it became clear that this commitment to 
waste reduction was not being translated into practice. Government spending during this 
time allocated approximately 16 billion dollars per year to all pollution programs, 
however, the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) reported that in 
1984, only 4 million dollars, less than 1% of the funds, were spent on waste reduction 
p r o g r a m s . A s  a result, the generation of hazardous waste continued to steadily 
increase; while the EPA estimated that the United States produced approximately 1 
billion pounds of hazardous waste per year at the end of WWII, more than 22 billion 
pounds were discharged in 1987.^^
Although waste reduction was defined as the preferred strategy at the policy 
level, in practice, a regulatory-based system, geared towards pollution control.
33 Ken Geiser, “Toxics Use Reduction and Pollution Prevention," New Solutions 
(Spring 1990): 43.
34 Ibid., See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. From Pollution to 
Prevention. (Washington D.C., June 1987), 39.
35 Ibid. See, U.S. EPA, The Hazardous Waste Svstem. (Washington, D.C., June
1 9 8 7 ) .
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dominated the government's approach to hazardous waste management. Pollution control 
is described as an "end-of -the -pipe" approach because its objective is to manage 
pollution after it has been discharged into the environment. For example, ash from an 
incinerator ends up buried in a landfill. This approach does not result in a reduction of 
waste because pollution control techniques merely transfer pollutants from one medium
to another.36
In the mid 1980's pollution control strategies came under attack. There was an 
increasing number of leaking landfills that contaminated ground water, and the costs 
associated with the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste were rising. Grassroots 
activists and others involved in the toxics movement demanded that the government shift 
its policies in support of waste reduction. Unlike pollution control, the goal of waste 
reduction is to reduce the volume and toxicity of hazardous waste before it is discharged. 
This approach is also referred to as "source reduction."
In 1984 Congress attempted to re-establish the government's commitment to 
waste reduction by passing the "Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments" to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act: "The Congress hereby declares it to be the national 
policy of the United States that, whenever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is 
to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as p o s s i b l e . " 3 7  However, once again, 
policy-level commitment did not translate into effective waste reduction practices.
In 1986 the OTA released an influential report —  "Serious Reduction of 
Hazardous Waste: For Pollution Prevention and Industrial Efficiency" —  that advocated 
the need for a new approach to hazardous waste management.33 This report argued that
36 Mark Rossi, Michael Ellenbecker, and Kenneth Geiser, "Techniques in Toxics 
Use Reduction: From Concept to Action," New Solutions (Fall 1991): 25-26.
37 U.S. Congress, Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. P.L. 98-616 
(98 Stat. 3221). November 8, 1984.
38 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, "Serious Reduction of 
Hazardous Waste: For Pollution prevention and Industrial Efficiency," Washington D.C., 
September, 1986.
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pollution control techniques, those that focus on the regulation of the discharge, 
treatment and disposal of hazardous waste, should be replaced with "pollution 
prevention" techniques, those that focus on the reduction and elimination of the 
generation of hazardous waste. OTA advocated pollution prevention for the following 
reasons; 1) pollution prevention benefits government because less waste entering the 
environment reduces the risk of mismanagement and lowers the cost of environmental 
treatment and remediation; 2) pollution prevention benefits companies because it 
lowers the costs associated with waste treatment, and fewer raw materials are needed 
because they can be recycled and reused in production; and 3)pollution prevention 
benefits everyone because it slows the depletion of natural resources.
While many in the toxics movement have fought hard to establish waste reduction 
as the top priority, there is a growing movement of activists who believe that the goals 
of pollution prevention can most effectively be addressed by reducing the volume and 
toxicity of the chemicals used in production processes. This strategy —  Toxics Use 
Reduction (TUR) —  recognizes that waste is not the only form of toxic chemicals that 
needs to be reduced or eliminated; 'The objective of toxics use reduction is the reduction 
or elimination of toxic chemicals in production whether the chemicals appear as waste, 
by-products, intermediaries, feed-stocks, or constituents of finished consumer 
products.
An important goal of the TUR and pollution prevention management strategy is to 
make sure that toxics-related health and environmental hazards are not transferred 
from one medium to another or from one population group to another. This objective is 
clearly defined in one of the leading state-level toxics use reduction bills; the 
Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act of 1989 defines TUR as "in-plant changes in 
production processes of raw materials that reduce, avoid, or eliminate the use of toxic
39 Ken Geiser, "Toxics Use Reduction," 45.
40 Ibid., 46.
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substances or generation of hazardous by-products per unit of production so as to reduce 
risks to the health of workers, consumers, or the environment without shifting risks 
between workers, consumers or parts of the environment."^^
TUR Techniques
The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA) defined the following TUR 
techniques to help industry translate the concept of TUR into technologies and practices 
that effectively reduce the use of toxic c h e m ic a ls ^ ^ :
• In process recycling - reusing or recycling a product within a production 
process;
• operations and maintenance - "good-housekeeping"- handling chemicals with 
greater efficiency without changing the production process. Examples include; 
employee training, management initiatives, spill and leak prevention, and material- 
handling improvement;
• production unit redesign or modification - changing or redesigning the 
production unit to one that requires fewer or no toxic inputs;
• production unit modernization - upgrading or replacing existing production 
unit equipment;
• input substitution - replacing the chemical(s) of concern with a non-toxic or
less toxic alternative;^^ and
• product reformulation - redesigning a product to create a product that has less 
or none of the toxic chemicals contained in the original. Example: manufacturing 
water based inks instead of organic solvent-based inks.
The Office of Technology Assessment reviewed these various techniques and found 
that the most effective techniques are employed the least. The most effective techniques
41 Mark Rossi et al., "Techniques in Toxics Use Reduction," 26-27. See 
Massachusetts General Laws, "Massachusetts toxics Use Reduction Act," Chapter 211 
July 24, 1989.
42 Ibid., 27-30.
43 Input substitution can be problematic because the "less" toxic chemical may 
be more hazardous in other ways. One must carefully study the replacement chemical to 
understand its potential impacts on workers, the public and the environment. There is 
also the chance that a chemical may be considered less toxic because it has not yet been 
thoroughly studied and labeled "toxic."
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are input substitution and product reformulation because they have the greatest 
potential to eliminate the use of toxics, however, the most frequently used techniques 
are recycling and operations and management (O&M) because they are usually easier and 
cheaper to implement.
Differences Between TUR and Pollution Control
There are several fundamental differences between pollution control and TUR. 
When one reviews these differences it becomes clear that TUR techniques more 
effectively achieve the goals of pollution prevention and illness prevention. In addition, 
TUR increases the opportunity for public participation in the decision-making process,
• Burden of Proof - Pollution control is founded on the assumption that the current 
regulatory system can adequately protect public health; as a result, toxic substances 
are innocent (not a public health threat) until proven guilty. TUR adopts a 
precautionary approach towards toxics and works to reduce or eliminate the use of 
toxics regardless of whether an existing health threat can be proven; as a result, one 
of the primary objectives of TUR is to prevent exposure whenever possible.
• Alternatives - Pollution control techniques discourage the development and 
implementation of safer alternatives to toxic chemicals because the primary 
objective is to design and enforce a regulatory system to manage pollution after it 
has been discharged. Since the central goal of TUR is to reduce or eliminate the 
production and use of toxics, the development and implementation of alternatives is 
one of its highest priorities.
• Implementation - Pollution control depends on enforceable regulatory control. 
TUR advocates recognize that relying on general regulations to promote TUR is 
problematic for several reasons: 1) industries vary significantly with respect to 
size, technology, market, and product; 2) there are not enough funds to effectively 
enforce a comprehensive regulatory system; and 3) there is strong resistance 
throughout industry against the introduction of new regulations. Instead of the 
conventional regulatory approach, TUR policies employ government mandated 
planning, goal setting and performance standards, government technical assistance, 
and financial incentives.
• D ecis ion-m aking and public partic ipation - Decisions within the pollution 
control management system are generally made behind closed doors and are rarely 
challenged by a demand for public accountability. TUR encourages negotiated planning 
that questions the use of chemicals in the production process; as a result, there is a 
greater opportunity for public participation and local accountability in the decision­
making process.
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Illness Prevention
Although pollution prevention is reemerging as a priority on the policy level, 
pollution control remains the dominant approach to hazardous waste management; How 
and to what extent should we manage the production, use, treatment, storage and disposal 
of toxic chemicals? As discussed earlier, EPA and other "expert" decision-makers 
employ risk assessment to answer these types of questions. Although the risk assessment 
process is riddled with uncertainty, decision-makers still claim that it can be used to 
safely manage toxics.
As long as pollution control remains the primary goal, decision-makers will 
continue to employ risk assessment to support their policy and management decisions. 
This use of risk assessment perpetuates an approach to toxics —  pollution control —  
that is fundamentally opposed to the goals of pollution and illness prevention:
In reality this [risk assessment] is a sophisticate form of the dilution solution. 
This '"acceptable risk" level is by definition an average and in almost all cases 
there will be some people exposed to higher levels and others exposed to lower 
levels. However, this is quite consistent with the goal of managing and not 
preventing exposures. EPA can now calculate a minimum level of exposure which 
is independent of any particular site and which ignores the ability to achieve 
lower emissions, better clean-ups or even eliminate the use, discharge or
exposure to a contaminant.'^^
Pollution control techniques will never be able to prevent illness because they 
are based on the philosophy that toxic substances are innocent until proven guilty; in 
other words, as long as we control and properly manage toxic substances, they do not 
pose a threat to public health. The Department's toxics policy is also based on this 
philosophy; it does not consider toxics to be a public health threat unless there is 
scientific evidence that proves a causal relationship. By supporting this philosophy the 
Department’s policy is committed to the concept of pollution control. There is nothing in 
the philosophy of pollution control that encourages the Department to take steps to
4'̂  Robert Ginsburg, "Quantitative Risk Assessment," 19.
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prevent exposures. While the Department's policy supports the idea that toxics are 
innocent until proven guilty, Padres, SKRAP, and many others in the toxics debate argue 
that toxics use reduction must be the top priority in order to achieve the goal of illness 
prevention.
Political Considerations
The Department claims that it practices a scientific approach to public health 
because it must make objective decisions without "taking sides." A weekly newsletter 
published by the Environmental Research Foundation suggests that there may be 
additional motivating factors behind the Department's emphasis on scientific certainty. 
This newsletter offers a theory explaining why the presence or absence of scientific 
certainty has such a significant influence on the actions of public health officials;'^^
Given the philosophical climate, public health officials are reluctant to raise an 
alarm on less-than-100%-certain data. As a practical matter an official will get 
in much more trouble for raising a false alarm about a suspected chemical than 
for making the opposite error (which allows birth defects to continue). In the 
present philosophical climate (requiring scientific certainty), even well 
justified alarm based on less-than -certain data draws an angry response from 
powerful monied interests. On the other hand, allowing birth defects to continue 
will only affect one family at a time. Individual, unorganized victims do not 
threaten a public health official’s job security.'^®
Padres and SKRAP agree that political pressures greatly influence the
Department’s actions. When Stormy was asked to make recommendations for the
Department, she referenced the situation in Buttonwillow:
If the Department thought that the Buttonwillow dump was lending itself to the 
illnesses, to the birth defects, they could exert their influence. We're not saying 
they can write closure notices but they could be holding meetings, press 
conferences, writing letters, saying that residents are already unjustly 
exposed... But they won't do that because this is an oil and agricultural county. 
They'd have the Board of Supervisors and the oil people raising hell. You see the 
County gets 10% of Laidlaw's gross income and that means there is a direct
45 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects."
46 Ibid.
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conflict of interests. Any agency that gets fees will not be honest. I'm just 
ashamed of the County.
Although lengthy technical documents detail Laidlaw's proposed expansion to 
"prove" that the facility will not significantly impact human health or the environment, 
Padres and other community members are not convinced. They understand that liners 
cannot guarantee that leaks will not occur, they are aware that accidents can and have 
happened involving the facility and the trucks transporting the hazardous material, and 
they know that an expansion increases the volume of hazardous waste and the potential 
risk to human health and the environment. During the final meeting of the County Board 
of Supervisors, Lorenzo Garcia, a resident and member of Padres, expressed his 
concern for the health of Button willow's children:
I'm here as a father to speak because I am quite worried...Everyone has been 
talking about money, the time involved, and time tables and things, but nobody 
has said anything about the children and the future of our children, what sort of 
future can our children stand to expect with a toxic dump site with thousands and 
thousands of cubic feet? And if we have gone to CRLA and Greenpeace, we have 
done it because you, our Supervisors, our officers, have done nothing to help us 
in learning how to deal with this.47
Throughout Padres' struggle with Laidlaw, the Department did not participate in 
the permitting process and did not actively support either side. Nevertheless, the 
Department influenced the County's position and its response to the community's 
concerns. After the Board of Supervisors listened to testimony from both sides, the 
meeting was closed to public comment and the members of the Board presented their 
final comments before calling for the vote. At this time. Supervisor Peterson began his 
testimony which eventually led to his vote in favor of the expansion. He addressed the 
issue of health risks at the beginning of his statement:
47 Lorenzo Garcia, Testimony from the written transcript of the Kern County 
Board of Supervisors meeting. Kern County, California, 12 December 1994. Mr. 
Garcia's testimony was translated during this meeting and recorded in the written 
tran scrip t.
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The, the health risks, I've talked to Doctor Jinadu about and these birth defects. 
Two of the problems that came up, the people that had those problems weren't 
here during their first trimester which is when that type of problem would 
occur of pregnancy (sic). And he said that it's attributed to other areas although 
the babies were born in this area and he feels it's no significant health risk as a 
result of air emission or some other problem during pregnancy.'^®
Supervisor Peterson's description of his exchange with Dr. Jinadu is consistent 
with the Department's toxics policy; without scientific evidence to prove a causal 
relationship, the Department would conclude that the dump does not represent a 
significant risk to human health or the environment. When Peterson made this reference 
to Dr. Jinadu's assessment of Button willow's birth defects cluster, the meeting had 
already been closed to public comment; there was no opportunity for the public to 
question or challenge the validity of Dr. Jinadu's position or the accuracy of Supervisor 
Peterson's c o m m e n t . In s te a d ,  Peterson used his communication with Dr. Jinadu to 
validate the position that the dump does not represent a significant health risk. During 
this meeting which lasted more than 8 hours, the Board of Supervisors spent very little 
time deliberating over the possible health risks associated with the dump. The majority 
of the meeting focused on the translation issue and a review of the competency of the 
Local Assessment Committee.
The conclusion reached by the Department and the County — the Laidlaw facility 
does not pose a significant health risk because there is no evidence that it caused the 
birth defects or other illnesses in Buttonwillow — is consistent with the philosophy that 
toxics are innocent until proven guilty. This philosophy places the burden of proof on 
groups like Padres to demonstrate that toxic chemicals are a threat to public health. As a
48 Supervisor Ken Peterson, Testimony from the written transcript of the Kern 
County Board of Supervisors meeting. Kern County, California, 12 December 1994.
49 Supervisor Peterson made a false statement when he claimed that 2 out of the 
three mothers did not live in Buttonwillow. According to the California Birth Defects 
Monitoring Program's report, "Neural Tube Defects in Kern County: Buttonwillow Area 
Investigation," only one out of the three mothers was dropped from the study because she 
was not a Buttonwillow resident.
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result, "non-experts" have to challenge and disprove conclusions reached by "experts." 
The burden of proof issue greatly impacts Padres because its limited resources and 
general lack of technical expertise make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
group to provide arguments that would satisfy the "scientific" standards required by the 
Department and other decision-makers like the County Board of Supervisors. If groups 
like Padres can't prove that Laidlaw's facility will lead to illness in its community, the 
decision becomes based on a cost-benefit analysis; in this type of decision-making 
arena, political forces significantly influence the final outcome.
Summary
As long as the presence or absence of scientific certainty continues to dictate the 
actions and decisions of the Department, its toxics policy will undermine Padres efforts 
to achieve environmental justice for two primary reasons: 1) the policy makes the 
Department less accessible to community groups as a source of information and support; 
and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goal of illness prevention.
Although the "non-expert" perspective is often devalued and dismissed as 
"emotional" and "biased," it is important to note that Padres and SKRAP are not arguing 
that the Department should abandon its "objective" approach to public health. They are 
not asking the Department to exaggerate or overreact. Instead, they want the Department 
to adopt a precautionary approach to toxics that takes into consideration the fact that 
there are well-documented human and environmental health hazards associated with 
toxic chemicals. They believe that the Department should adopt a toxics policy that 
promotes toxics use reduction instead of pollution control.
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C o n c lu s io n
This research paper addresses the following question; How does the Kern County 
Public Health Department's toxics policy affect Padres struggle for environmental 
justice? It concludes that the Department's toxics policy directly undermines Padres' 
efforts to achieve environmental justice for two primary reasons: 1) the policy makes 
the Department less accessible to grassroots groups as a potential source of information 
and support: and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goal of illness prevention.
This final chapter is organized into three main sections that provide concluding 
remarks regarding: 1) Padres and the grassroots environmental justice movement; 2) 
the Department and its role in the environmental justice movement; and 3) the 
relationship between Padres and the Department and the potential for these groups to 
work together in the future.
Padres
Like the majority of community groups in the environmental justice movement, 
Padres encounters many obstacles because it is trying to create fundamental changes 
within the dominant white culture, a culture that has established effective institutions 
to protect its ownership and control of the nation's political and economic power. 
Although there are thousands of groups like Padres engaged in local battles over specific 
environmental hazards, these immediate threats are symptoms of a much greater 
problem.
Poor communities and communities of color are threatened by systemic problems 
rooted in social, political and economic injustice. Padres' struggle is not just about 
preventing the expansion of Laidlaw's toxic dump. It is about empowering and mobilizing 
a community to fight for social and economic justice. It is about changing the heavily
102
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skewed distribution pattern of political and economic power, and it is about increasing 
public participation in the decision-making process. Therefore, although Padres and 
other community groups face many difficult challenges, and although Padres and others 
might lose their individual battles, the environmental justice movement is becoming 
stronger and more effective because an increasing number of communities are 
organizing to create structural changes that address the systemic problems threatening 
poor communities and communities of color.
Kern Countv Public Health Department
At first glance, the Department's role in Padres' struggle for environmental 
justice is not easily defined; the Department does not officially participate in the 
decision-making process governing the proposed expansion of the dump, and the two 
groups do not have an established relationship. Nevertheless, the influence of the 
Department is significant. This paper examined two main reasons why the Department’s 
toxic policy directly undermines Padres' efforts to achieve environmental justice.
First, the policy makes the Department less accessible to community groups as a 
potential source of information and support. The Department's demand for scientific 
certainty —  toxics are not a threat unless scientific evidence proves a causal 
relationship — creates a barrier between itself and community groups like Padres, 
between "experts" and "non-experts. " Community concerns and recommendations are 
often prematurely labeled and dismissed as "emotional" and "biased." This devaluation of 
the "non-expert" approach isolates the two groups and decreases the potential for the 
development of an effective working relationship.
Second, the Department's toxics policy does not support Padres' efforts because it 
conflicts directly with the goal of illness prevention. The Department's emphasis on 
scientific certainty does not prevent illness because people must be harmed before any
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action is taken. In addition, this policy supports the conventional approach to hazardous 
waste management —  pollution control —  which is an "end-of-the-pipe" strategy that 
focuses on managing pollutants after they have been discharged. Pollution control does 
not prevent pollution or illness because it perpetuates the myth that toxics can be 
"safely" managed, that toxics are innocent until proven guilty. As a result, pollution 
control techniques make no effort to reduce or eliminate the use of toxics. Toxics Use 
Reduction, a strategy committed to eliminating or reducing the volume and toxicity of the 
chemicals used in production processes, was presented as the preferred alternative 
because it promotes pollution prevention and illness prevention.
While this paper evaluated the effects of the Department's toxics policy on 
Padres, it was beyond the scope of this research to delve into the motivating forces that 
shape the policy. Although the Department argues that its actions and decisions are based 
on science and an objective approach to public health. Padres and SKRAP contend that 
political pressures significantly influence the Department's approach to toxics. The 
Kern County Board of Supervisors favors the proposed expansion of Laidlaw's facility; 
the County would benefit from the expansion because it receives ten percent of Laidlaw's 
gross income. As an employee of the County, it would not be in the Department's best 
interest to challenge the County's position.
Within the political climate of Kern County, the Department's policy provides a 
good measure of job security; the Department's conservative approach to public health 
does not question the status quo or attempt to implement controversial policies that 
would meet with the disapproval of the County. Instead, the Department's policy and 
approach to toxics supports a system that employs quantitative risk assessment and 
pollution control techniques. As long as the Department maintains this policy, it will 
continue to undermine Padres' efforts and the efforts of the environmental justice 
movement, and it will fail to achieve its own stated goal of illness prevention.
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Relationship. Between the Department and Padres
When I first began this project I had an idealistic vision that Padres and the 
Department could work together effectively. Since both groups share the goal of illness 
prevention, I hoped the Department would recognize the importance of supporting the 
environmental justice movement. However, after conducting interviews with 
representatives of the Department and Padres, I began to seriously question whether 
groups with such different perspectives could find common ground.
Currently, there are significant obstacles hindering the development of a 
successful partnership. The Department's devaluation of the "non-expert" approach 
makes it very difficult for Padres to participate in the decision-making process, and the 
Department is less accessible as a source of information and support. Furthermore, the 
two groups' perspectives on public health and toxics —  what they define as the problem 
and what they define as the solution —  are vastly different; while Padres and other 
environmental justice activists focus on the need to make structural changes to alleviate 
the systemic problems of social, political and economic injustice, the Department's 
conservative approach to toxics supports the status quo, including the use of quantitative 
risk assessment and pollution control techniques.
Although the barriers are significant, the Department's mission statement 
clearly establishes that one of its objectives is to "build and foster strong partnerships 
for health" with the communities it serves. While Dr. Jinadu expressed repeatedly 
during his interviews that the Department would be more than willing to meet with 
Padres, there is a strong possibility that the politically charged issue of toxics and the 
proposed expansion of the dump would stifle any potential for the development of a 
successful partnership. It is highly unlikely that the Department will abandon its toxics 
policy to embrace the goals of toxics use reduction. Nevertheless, it might be possible 
and worthwhile for Padres to initiate communication with the Department so that the
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issue of toxics Is brought to the table as a legitimate public health concern of the 
Buttonwillow community.
The Healthy Cities Project (Project) has the potential to facilitate 
communication between Padres and the Department. In theory, the Project could help 
remove some of the barriers between these two groups because one of its primary 
objectives is to involve the community as much as possible in the decision-making 
process. Instead of devaluing the "non-expert" community perspective, the Project 
recognizes the importance of developing community leadership; the community plays an 
integral role in defining its health needs and implementing solutions. The Department 
participates as a system of support but it is not there to dictate the course of action. This 
approach to problem solving encourages constructive dialogue between groups like the 
Department and Padres because at least in theory the "experts" and the "non-experts" 
are equal partners. Because the Healthy Cities Project focuses on the process of 
improving the health of a community, it shares some of the goals of the environmental 
justice movement; the Healthy Cities model "conceptualizes community health in its 
broadest sense, to Include the physical environment, economic conditions, and the social 
climate within the city."^
Many Healthy Cities projects have dealt with more traditional public health 
issues such as increasing childhood immunization rates. The toxics issue is politically 
volatile and would most likely be difficult to incorporate into a Healthy Cities project. 
How would the Department react to a community that wanted to examine toxics as a 
public health threat? According to the Project, the community defines the health need it 
wants to address; in theory, if the community focused on reducing the threat of pollution 
and toxics-related illnesses, the Department is supposed to assist. Even if the 
Department refused to participate in a project focused on toxics use reduction, the toxics
I Western Consortium for Public Health, California Healthy Cities Protect 
(Sacramento, CA, 1992).
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issue would receive more attention and the concerns of the community would be voiced. 
Perhaps this would create some opportunity for the development of an effective 
communication link between Padres and the Department.
It remains to be seen whether Padres and the Department could work 
cooperatively on a Healthy Cites project. Would Padres be willing to initiate contact with 
the Department? Would the Department listen to and respect Padres' perspective, or 
would the toxics debate create too much tension and conflict? These are just a few of the 
many questions that remain unanswered. As a grassroots community group Padres faces 
significant obstacles: How will the group fare in the years to come? It may also be many 
years before we know whether Laidlaw is allowed to expand the dump.
Regardless of how future events unfold, it is important to recognize that even if 
Laidlaw is allowed to expand its dump, Padres struggle represents a victory for the 
environmental justice movement. The victory is the fact that there was a struggle in the 
first place. For too long these types of decisions have gone unchallenged. Similarly, 
while the Department may never adopt toxics use reduction strategies, the purpose of 
this paper was to question and challenge its toxics policy. The Department should be held 
accountable to its stated mission to prevent illness. Hopefully this paper can be useful to 
Padres and other groups willing to help redefine the role of local health departments in 
the environmental justice movement.
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The environmental justice movement questions the fundamental structure of our 
"modern," "democratic," society. How are decisions made? Who makes them? How do 
they affect our communities? How can "non-experts" participate in the decision-making 
process? How can community groups help create structural changes to address the 
systemic problems of economic, political, and social injustice?
The following recommendations are directed at Padres, SKRAP and other 
community groups that may be interested in challenging the Department's toxics policy.
1. In it ia te  Contact
Based on the Department's current relationship with Padres and SKRAP, and 
based on the fact that it does not keep a list of the community groups in Kern County, it 
is evident that the Department does not actively "build and foster strong partnerships 
for health" with groups like Padres. Therefore, it is necessary to initiate contact with 
the Department. While this is certainly no guarantee that the Department will 
enthusiastically embrace such a gesture, at the very least it provides an opportunity to 
learn more about the Department's mission, its services, and the role it plays in your 
community? This knowledge allows you to evaluate more accurately the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Department's policies, actions and decisions. Contacting the 
Department will alert it to the fact that your group exists, and it may provide you with 
an opportunity to voice your group's concerns, including any specific opinions about the 
Department. It is important to hold the Department accountable to its stated commitment 
and obligation to protect public health.
1 08
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2. Participate in the Healthy Cities Project
As local health officials, the Department must be accessible to the communities it 
serves. According to its mission statement, one of the Department's responsibilities is to 
"build and foster strong partnerships for health." Although the issue of toxics is likely 
to create tension, the Healthy Cities Project provides a structure in which the 
community is encouraged to voice its health concerns. And, at least in theory, the 
Department has made a commitment to assist communities that want to participate in the 
Healthy Cities Project.
The Healthy Cities Project might be able to create some common ground between 
your group and the Department because its goals are consistent with those of the 
environmental justice movement; the Project focuses on the need to empower people, the 
need for public participation in determining health needs and devising and implementing 
solutions, and the need to revise the current definition of community health so that it 
includes the physical environment, economic conditions, and the social climate within 
the city.
If the Department is not willing to work on a project that focuses on toxics- 
related health issue, it is important to remind the Department of the main objective of 
the Healthy Cities Project: "Resident participation in determining health needs as well 
as devising and implementing solutions is the cornerstone of the Healthy Cities 
approach." Although there is no guarantee that the Department will accept your 
proposal, the efforts your group makes to participate will send important messages: 1) 
your group is concerned about toxics-related health issues; 2) your group is committed 
to reducing the threat of toxics in your community; and 3) your group is willing to work 
with the Department to achieve this goal. The Department needs to be constantly 
reminded that there are concerned residents of Kern County who are dedicated to the goal 
of toxics use reduction. It is imperative to question and challenge the Department as
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often as possible and the Healthy Cities Project provides an opportunity to present your 
group's concerns.
3 .  Participate in the Decision-making Process
Increasing public participation in the decision-making process is one of the 
major objectives of the environmental justice movement. Community groups must 
play a more active role in influencing the decisions that affect the health of their 
communities. Currently, the atmosphere in most "public" hearings is hostile and 
intimidating to members of the public. Decision-makers set the agenda and dominate 
the discussion. Members of the public need to change the current "rules" of behavior. 
Make sure that your issues of concern are not ignored or prematurely dismissed 
without being addressed in a meaningful and thorough manner. Demand to be given 
enough time to voice your opinions; there is no reason why decision-makers should 
be granted an unlimited amount of time to engage in a debate that directly affects 
your community, while members of the public are only given 3-5 minutes to 
comment.
Furthermore, the structure of most meetings places the public comment period 
at the end of the meeting, if there is time. This places you at a distinct disadvantage 
because decision-makers are often tired and eager to bring the meeting to a close. In 
addition, your comments have less of an impact if you are trying to address issues 
that have already been discussed earlier in the meeting; request that the public be 
allowed to comment on each issue before moving on to the next. This will guarantee 
that your voice is heard throughout the meeting, and it will ensure that the meeting 
will not come to an end before you are allowed to speak. If English is not your first 
language, request that a translator be provided to translate your comments as well as 
those of the decision-makers.
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4 . Shift the Burden of Proof
The burden of proof is currently placed on community groups to demonstrate that 
toxics are a threat to public health. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove 
that a causal relationship exists. As a result, the concerns and recommendations of 
the "non-expert" community groups are often labeled as "emotional" and "biased." 
Instead of accepting the burden of proof, your group needs to make a strong effort to 
shift this responsibility to the polluters and the decision-makers. For example, if 
there is a proposal to site or expand a toxic facility, ask the interested parties to 
provide "proof" that your community will not be harmed. In the case of the 
Department, Dr. Jinadu's reasoning —  toxic facilities like Laidlaw's and those 
scattered throughout Rosamond are not a public health threat because there is no 
proof that they caused the illnesses —  should be challenged. Where is the proof that 
they didn't contribute to the health problems of those communities. Where is the 
proof that an expansion of Laidlaw's facility will not negatively impact the health of 
Buttonwillow residents?
5. Reject Risk Assessment and Pollution Control
Although the quantitative risk assessment process can provide information about 
the hazards or risks associated with a particular substance or action, it should not be 
misinterpreted as a scientifically proven measurement of what is and is not "safe. " 
Because its measurements are riddled with uncertainty, it should not be employed by 
policy-makers and decision-makers to convince the public that there is no need for 
concern, and no need to research, develop, or implement safer alternatives. Your group 
should pressure the Department and other decision-makers to adopt a precautionary 
approach to toxics that recognizes that uncertainties must be considered in any risk 
assessment and policy decision. The reality is that risk assessment can never be
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perfectly accurate. It can never account for all of the factors that affect the equation, and 
it shouldn't be assumed that unknown factors are not hazards .
Risk assessment is fundamentally opposed to the concept of developing 
alternatives to reduce or eliminate the use of toxics. Instead, it focuses on defining the 
"acceptable" ways to poison life on Earth. Risk assessment asks the wrong questions: 
Which toxic chemicals can be released into the air, water and land? What are acceptable 
exposure levels? Your group needs to challenge these questions by asking: Does our 
society need to continue using toxics? What are the alternatives? Research, 
development, and implementation of alternatives that eliminate or reduce the use of 
toxics must be made the top priority.
The public has the right to demand that the Department, other decision-makers, 
and polluters make the greatest possible effort to protect public health. Your group 
should pressure the Department and other decision-makers to promote toxics use 
reduction (TUR) techniques instead of the current pollution control management 
strategy, because unlike pollution control, TUR establishes illness prevention and 
pollution prevention as top priorities.
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